


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# West Europe Report



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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18 JULY 1986

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POLITICAL

AUSTRIA

STEGER ON LIBERAL PARTY CONTROVERSIES, ROLE OF HAIDER

Vienna PROFIL in German 20 May 86 pp 16-26

[Interview with Dr Norbert Steger, deputy chancellor and national chairman of the Austrian Liberal Party (FPOe) by Helmut Voska: "'Haider Is Risking the Party's Suicide'"]

[Text] PROFIL: Dr Steger, you have compared what is taking place in your party at present to the staging of a farce. How will this Blue absurd theater end? Who is going to be the dupe at the end--Dr Haider or you?

Steger: For me the question is a different one: who is going to be hurt if things continue this way in the party? People are going to vote for this party in the next election only if it acts independently and credibly in the vital Austrian questions. All this internal party wrangling is not going to motivate a single voter to vote for this party.

PROFIL: Who is responsible for this wretched performance the FPOe is offering us--the producer, the actors, or poor direction?

Steger: Since we became a government party, conscious attempts at disruption have been directed against us...

PROFIL: ...by FPOe people.

Steger: Yes, many FPOe people are consistently attempting to disparage the reputation of the FPOe government team. I am thinking primarily of Carinthian party Chairman Dr Haider. For 3 years now, he has been constantly calling for a special party congress, and for 3 years he has also been directing insults at me. None of this would be happening if this government had a stronger general support. But it does not. I think it is a sad testimony for Dr Haider as a politician. Actually he can cause excitement only with attacks on his own party friends.

PROFIL: But Haider has been the only one among the FPOe people to win elections.

Steger: But everyone knows that a different wind blows in Carinthia. There is a Slovene minority, and slogans of "Get away from Vienna" fall on fertile ground. Our 52,000 FPOe voters in Vienna do not consider Haider's pronouncements popular in any way.

PROFIL: If you can still affect further developments--which is by no means certain, because more and more of your party friends are turning against the party leader--what is going to happen?

Steger: I am not under the impression that more and more people are conspiring against me. The only reason why the public does not know what will happen with the FPÖ is because I have not spelled things out yet...

PROFIL: Do spell things out, Mr Deputy Chancellor.

Steger: I am devoting myself first to the Austrians' vital questions, such as the nuclear question, and only after that to the wrangling in my party. One thing is taken care of after another.

PROFIL: So what does your plan to end the internal FPÖ dispute look like? Do you have one?

Steger: Of course I have. Wherever I go I say that it is by no means a question of two liberal parties fighting each other but a question of the Carinthian chairman proceeding in an untenable way against the party as a whole--and not for the first time. And at a time at that when we were in the process of gaining political terrain. We have completed a presidential election campaign in which the major parties made utter fools of themselves. In the person of Dr Krüenes we nominated an excellent defense minister, and in the person of Dr Frischenschlager an outstanding leader of the party in Parliament. If at this very time, 11 months before the National Council elections, Dr Haider launches his major attack, it is a question of placing oneself outside the party, of inflicting substantial damage on its interests. And then it becomes impossible for the party as a whole to put up with that without any sanctions. Everyone has come to understand that.

PROFIL: And what happens?

Steger: Haider has to be called on once more to take back his untenable statements and his disruptive actions. Only then will the way be open to compromises.

PROFIL: From Dr Haider's point of view, though, everything looks different. He says you have not kept agreements in connection with the government reshuffle, that you broke your word and yourself did damage to the party.

Steger: Dr Haider approached the most important personnel questions of the republic in an unserious manner which is hard to match. You know that on my proposal Dr Krüenes was designated defense minister without a dissenting vote. Thereupon Haider said that Carinthian functionaries Huber and Mrs Trattnig were ministerial caliber. If someone behaves that way, I say that he is not making a serious effort to take the interests of the republic into account in questions of personnel. As far as I am concerned, I never broke my word at any time. I utterly reject that charge. In the meantime I have informed all functionaries in writing about what has been agreed with the Carinthian party chairman, and when. Haider is treading a very dangerous path.



PROFIL: How so?

Steger: Already today Haider is no longer regarded by many people within SPÖ and ÖVP as a person with whom one can conclude an agreement. Many Liberal functionaries will now also share this view. To reproach me for having broken my word is definitely a grave untruth.

PROFIL: On 20 May, the party tribunal will deal with the case of Haider and Haider's people's-rebellion party congress in Carinthia will be meeting at the same time. What is to be expected of the Carinthians, and what is to be expected of the judges?

Steger: What I expect on my part is for everyone to calm down a little. I do not have anything against someone being particularly ambitious and wanting to make something of himself. But a little self-restraint in the way one wants to get ahead is called for. If one has to fill the post of defense minister, one cannot be guided by the interests of provincial party organizations but must seek the best man wherever he may come from...

PROFIL: ...But evidently you took only the second best, for you first wanted to make the Upper Austrian FPÖ leader Horst Schender a minister.

Steger: Yes, I did ask Horst Schender first; he declined my offer despite several attempts to persuade him. I then proposed Kruenes, and a party chairman must make a feasible proposal. There was no one who proposed Dr Haider or anyone else for the ministry, for instance. We voted in writing and in secret--in other words, democratically--and the decision to fill the post of party faction chairman in Parliament with Frischenschlager proceeded just as unequivocally. Haider's procedure--of public dispute--disqualifies him for any kind of leading position in our party.

PROFIL: You adroitly evaded my question concerning the party tribunal, but you can't avoid answering it.

Steger: I don't dare predict what the decision of the party tribunal will be. That also depends on the language of the charge. I did not draft it...

PROFIL: ...Who did...?

Steger: ...The national executive manager did. There is no question in my opinion that what Haider is saying about me meets the criterion of action injurious to the party. There are some Haider statements which would suffice even to win a trial in criminal court. There were some slanders...

PROFIL: ...What kind?

Steger: For understandable reasons, I would not like to repeat them all. First, Haider called me a "gambler." Now it is continuing with "lie" and "breaking one's word." There are accusations which in any regular court would lead to Haider being sentenced for slander.

PROFIL: Is it in fact imaginable that the party tribunal would judge Haider more leniently than a regular court?

Steger: I don't assume so. Only, our party tribunal does not assess the punishment. The punishment to be imposed is decided on by the party executive. Actually we only wanted to gain time by turning the case of Haider over to the party tribunal. We want to see to it that reason prevails again to a greater extent.

PROFIL: But that presumably was idle speculation on your part?

Steger: I am not sure about that. Meanwhile Haider has become more cautious again with his statements. He has meanwhile moved away again from his wish himself to become national chairman of the FPÖ. You see, there is still not a single provincial party organization which advocates that Haider replace Steger.

PROFIL: The Upper Austrian party organization in a written resolution has called for an FPÖ leadership which enjoys the confidence of all FPÖ provincial organizations. Probably you now only enjoy the confidence of the Vienna provincial party organization, whose chairman you are.

Steger: No, no; that is not the way it is. I will only say this much about it: It is true that the Vienna provincial party organization has made it known unanimously that there will be no relevant decision without me, but let us go a step further. What kind of respect is a party to enjoy if its chairman, who is deputy chancellor and minister of trade and against whom no political reproach could be made in the past year and a half, is treated this way? What kind of respect is a party to enjoy if its Deputy Huber certifies in writing his presidential election support for someone like Dr Otto Scrinci. And then says, "I didn't know that this replaces 26,000 signatures." What kind of respect is a party to enjoy if this Huber of all people a short time later is described as having ministerial caliber? What kind of respect is a party to enjoy if Dr Haider states publicly that Dr Scrinci's action is a suitable tool for party reform?

PROFIL: You are right: one cannot respect your party.

Steger: It is 5 minutes before midnight. There must not be any such statements any more. As it is, it will be hard enough for the FPÖ to be successful in the coming National Council elections.

PROFIL: One also senses this bunker mentality in conversations with other FPÖ politicians. "Something has to happen," everyone says. Am I right in presuming that at present about two-thirds of the FPÖ Executive would vote for Dr Haider's expulsion and only one-third for a so-called ban from any functions until the National Council elections: It will really be very embarrassing for you if then this Dr Haider of all people is confirmed as Carinthian party chairman by an enthusiastic party congress.

Steger: Look, I can remember Dr Ferrari-Brunnenfeld being elected Carinthian party chairman at a Carinthian party congress with 97 percent of the vote, and then being removed by Haider within a year. Haider should not think that he is irreplaceable as Carinthian party chairman. People are followed by people, the saying goes. Tirol party Chairman Rigentler answered your question as to what would happen then when he said at a party executive meeting, in effect: "Haider must be prepared to admit his error." That is honorable. No jewel would have fallen out of Haider's crown if this February he not only had apologized to me during the party executive meeting but had also announced it to the press. Everyone makes mistakes.

PROFIL: What is your prognosis concerning the judgment of the party tribunal?

Steger: I do not prophesy anything, and I do not influence anything; I wait and see.

PROFIL: And on the party executive, where Haider's punishment will be fixed?

Steger: There I will have an important say. But that will also depend on what happens until then.

PROFIL: It is not my impression that Haider will yet change his course.

Steger: So far, behind closed doors he has done so quite often at party executive meetings. Only later, when he was back home in Carinthia, he did not remember any more. It is true of Haider to a special extent that what he has said, and had a say in, in Vienna he forgets again on the way home by the time he reaches Semmering.

PROFIL: So let us assume that the FPÖe tragic drama proceeds according to your direction or my forecasts. Will you then decide to do without the only FPÖe leader who has been successful with the electorate? Will you then summon all Carinthian FPÖe delegates before the party tribunal? Will that mean a split of the FPÖe into its nuclear components, or will it rather lead to the fall of Steger?

Steger: There is a historical precedent. Dr Stueber, leader of our predecessor party, the VdU [Union of Independents], was very successful. He has 120,000 votes in Vienna and constantly tried to blackmail his party. Once, something or other was not decided the way he wanted, and he quit, taking a lot of functionaries with him. Finally he ran against the Union of Independents, but the VdU received about four times as many votes as Dr Stueber. Any leading politician should realize that he can be successful only if he is supported by his party.

PROFIL: You remind me of Sinowatz: One is nothing without a party. Haider probably says about himself that he is everything, and the party nothing.

Steger: What I blame Dr Haider for most is the wholesale revilement of the entire FPÖe leadership. Surely everyone, whether his name is Schender, Frischenschlager, Dillesberger, Ofner, Grabher-Heyer, Steger, or Haider, has



a certain share in the electorate. Each has to come up with his voters, and it is therefore irresponsible to put down these leading party functionaries the way Haider does. The second thing I especially blame him for is his games with figures. Haider rightly is pleased that he and his friends were able to enthrone 37,000 voters. But Haider overlooks the fact that we in Vienna, for example, come up with 52,000 voters. At the last National Council elections there were 48,000 FPÖ voters in Upper Austria. In each instance, these are also important liberal voters. I suggest another scenario to him: Let each of us show at the National Council elections how many additional voters he can come up with—without revilement of the other side. Revilement of the other side is popular only at home. Haider must once for all stop reviling the chairman and party.

PROFIL: I do understand that you want to gain time until April 1987. But the question about your party chairmanship is a current one.

Steger: It is not really.

PROFIL: Justice Minister Ofner certainly would not object to taking your place now.

Steger: You are mistaken. Ofner has stated very clearly that he does not have that in mind.

PROFIL: All he said is that he would not run against you. If the leading FPÖ functionaries came to him and there was no opposing candidate, Ofner certainly would be pleased to succeed Steger.

Steger: Well, let me clear things up at once: I will certainly run at the coming party congress, and I am also fully convinced that I will be reelected.

PROFIL: Ofner went to see the rebellious FPÖ people in Carinthia. Is he trying to mediate, or is he canvassing votes for the election of a chairman?

Steger: I rule that out. Ofner is not disloyal. For sure.

PROFIL: There will be no early party congress?

Steger: No, that is not my intention. Though I admit that some party conferences in the provinces have created the impression of a certain drama, I do not view them as all that dramatic. I would not like to rule out altogether the possibility that there can be other considerations which might lead to an early party congress. But in that case too it is true that I will run again for party chairman, that I will be a candidate.

PROFIL: Haider has said that he could submit signatures of one-third of the party congress delegates and thus force a special party congress.

Steger: I don't think it is impossible that he can do so. One-third is not such a high peg. Then a party congress would have to be called within 4 weeks. But even then there would be no political reason whatever for me not to run.

Voting me out of the office in that kind of a situation presumably would mean that the FPOe loses its capacity to participate in the government.

PROFIL: No government without Steger? Aren't you overestimating yourself?

Steger: There can be no doubt about it. A government party, after all, must remain qualified to form a coalition, and with someone like Dr Haider at the top it would not be so any longer. What I am afraid of most is that an OeVP strategy will bear fruit which starts with farmers' demonstrations and unrest in the FPOe and creates a pretext in the SPOe for ending the legislative period prematurely. That is also the reason why I am making such efforts quietly to continue working on the vital questions of the Austrian people.

PROFIL: You mean a Chancellor Sinowatz simply could not [work together] with a party Chairman Haider?

Steger: I cannot answer that question for Sinowatz, but I am convinced that neither the SPOe nor the OeVP could work together with Haider, because his word does not mean very much.

PROFIL: Give me an example.

Steger: Haider wanted to accomplish a lot in the case of the Maltatal power plant after he had shaken the Carinthian population and had treated the representatives of the power company there very rudely. Haider wanted me, as a minister, to issue a ban forbidding the people he had slandered to sue him. Surely I can't do such a thing in a constitutional state. When the suit was brought, Haider apologized and assumed the costs of the proceedings. Or take the question of Zwentendorf. When the pressure on the FPOe became very great more than a year ago, Haider called for a change in the Liberal antinuclear line.

PROFIL: That means he would be even more accommodating toward Sinowatz than you are, doesn't it?

Steger: No. Haider only blows with the wind. No one remembers today that Haider in connection with ZEST [Zinsertragsteuer=Tax on Earned Interest] proposed the introduction of an anonymity levy. No one recalls today that Dr Haider proposed that Dr Androsch be elected director of the CA [Creditanstalt] Board. All these things which I had to carry out after the decisions in the committees, he used to make me look suspect and attack me in his own party. As of now I have to demand greater loyalty by all FPOe functionaries toward the party, not toward Dr Steger. I feel I am treated unfairly and shabbily if someone no longer stands by what he himself has had a share in.

PROFIL: All that you are putting forward against Haider as a possible deputy chancellor and FPOe chairman may be valid, but it does not apply in the event that Dr Ofner at the request of many liberals takes over the leading post. Surely you have not failed to notice the concerns of leading liberal functionaries at the prospect of having to go into the elections with Dr Steger. Lower Austrian FPOe National Council Deputy Dr Guggerbauer has said: "There

exists a strong desire in the party to rearrange the leadership setup."

Steger: Dr Guggerbauer also had the mistaken notion that there was a strong desire for him to become the leader of the FPÖ faction in Parliament. He was then very surprised that only two deputies abstained when Dr Frischenschlager was elected leader. It is a fact, after all, that Dr Ofner has stated clearly and unambiguously that I am doing well as party chairman and deputy chancellor. And that will not change in the next few years either. But there is one thing more I need to say in the direction of Dr Haider. With his statement he has disqualified himself for good. To pull out his own people from the national party, himself only to come to Vienna when there are personnel questions to be decided, to declare war against all the rest of the FPÖ, to demonstrate against the agricultural policy of the government being made at the Office of the Federal Chancellor precisely with the participation of the FPÖ—those surely are all political mistakes which our functionaries can recognize and evaluate as such.

PROFIL: How do you intend to pull the ground from under the criticism against Steger?

Steger: I will try in the next few months to keep out of all the personnel wrangling. And I will try to make it even clearer than before that Steger stands for a liberal economic policy which, though it has not had satisfactory results everywhere, has scored definitely noticeable successes. Steger stands for a new energy policy which has not existed in Austria in the past and which is now being supported by the entire government. Zwentendorf is dead. And Steger stands for a liberal, tolerant, and conciliatory climate, which as of now has been politically destroyed. If the big parties move away from one another to a great extent during the presidential election campaign, then this will give us a new political opportunity. We will try to build political bridges. These are my tasks, and if I cope with them well my party will elect me.

PROFIL: The general FPÖ opinion climate looks different, though.

Steger: No, that is not so.

PROFIL: Guggerbauer is not at all alone with his criticism. The Ring of Liberal Youth [RFJ] too demands that you be replaced, saying that you lack the ability to integrate which is needed to pull this now tiny party, this bag of fleas, together.

Steger: Well, the Carinthian chairman of the RFJ also calls for the election of Haider without believing in Haider's ability to integrate.

PROFIL: You will recall that the Tirolean Dr Dillesberger also waged a clear anti-Steger election campaign, and won with it.

Steger: He did not win, but lost some fractions of a percentage point; but he was politically successful. In his immediate election district, Kufstein, he scored considerable gains. It is simply an ostrich policy in light of the social shifts and the changes in the voters' attitude to argue indefensibly



about the qualities of the FPÖ chairman. All over Europe political leaders are increasingly being pulled down. And all that at a time when we are in the government for the first time. One-third of our voters always have been protest voters, and the only danger is that Dr Haider is mobilizing against me this third of protesters whom we urgently need as voters at a time when they were about to come back to the FPÖ.

PROFIL: What motives do you impute to Dr Haider?

Steger: Haider always works with fears. Now with the fear of the death of the party. And risks the suicide of the party by doing so. In Vienna Haider is not mobilizing a single voter that way. His phrase mongering impresses no one in the middle classes. He can earn wild applause only among those who are "opposed" in principle--in other words, also opposed to this government.

PROFIL: To stick to the suicide image: with Steger as a figurehead, the consequences for the National Council elections in 11 months would be lethal, many FPÖ people say. To avoid suicide, Steger should be replaced.

Steger: But that is all nonsense. It is an illusion to believe that a new Liberal party chairman at the same time can make positive government policy and rail about it outside in order to appeal to anyone dissatisfied. That leads to political ruin. We have to stop at long last sawing off the branch of the tree we are perched on.

PROFIL: Even if you are not prepared to resign, is the universal criticism in your party of Secretary General Grabher-Meyer going to lead to his resignation?

Steger: Let me say once more: As long as I have the feeling that we will do better at the next election with me as party chairman than without me, I will stay and fight. In the final analysis, I will also not let myself be deprived of the political success I have brought the party. For the first time in history, the party is in the government, it has a new party program, and it is now no longer possible to bring the FPÖ into ill repute with nazism. The nuclear question has been buried in Austria. That too has been coped with. Through me the party will experience a further participation in the government. Then will come the time when I will think about my personal future. As for Grabher-Meyer, let me just say that he has been under strain.

PROFIL: I hear that after his unsuccessful election recommendation in favor of Steyrer he offered you his resignation. Why did you not take advantage of that opportunity? Am I right in claiming that immediately after the case of Haider is closed Mrs Partik-Pable will become secretary general of the FPÖ?

Steger: I won't comment on that. I don't wish to deny or confirm anything.

PROFIL: To sum up things, I can of course not agree with your portrayal of the FPÖ. I see a picture of a fiercely split bunch of functionaries whose existence this country could easily afford to dispense with. Your internal party intrigues are of interest only to the extent that they could lead to the premature end of this government.

Steger: I do know that the two of us will not be at one in praising the FPÖe.

PROFIL: Eleven months before the election, this is the way things look: After the Steyrer debacle of 4 May, your coalition partner is worse off than at any time in the past 20 years. The Greens presumably are twice as strong as the current FPÖe. What is left of the visions of former Chancellor Kreisky? That one need only give the FPÖe a chance to put in an appearance in the government and solve problems and sooner or later two equally strong bourgeois parties will compete with one another. Social democracy would retain power—along the Swedish pattern? What has become of that under the leadership of Sinowatz and Steger? The ÖVP enjoys greater support among the voters than does the SPÖe, and the Greens have overtaken the FPÖe. Do you feel you share the responsibility for Kreisky's dreams not having become reality?

Steger: The Greens, if they run jointly, are no stronger than we are. Unless in the past 10 days Haider with his flailing has driven potential FPÖe voters into the arms of the Greens. Haider's phrasemongering is not appealing to, but repelling, a number of voters. I assume that we soon will have the problem of Haider behind us. It will soon dawn on him that he will never manage to get to the top of the party. Liberal middle-class parties have not become major parties anywhere in Europe. This segment of the electorate, conscious of performance, intellectual, and cosmopolitan, is no majority group. Many voters in Austria continue to sit with their feet stretched out in the front row watching whether the FPÖe will develop into such a dream party. Let me draw your attention to the fact that the group of people who consider us electable is becoming bigger all the time. If in the past it amounted to up to 12 percent of those entitled to vote, they amount to up to 27 percent today. The reservoir of those who will want us to represent them politically one day has become very much bigger. But I agree with you that this form of pulling oneself down and of arguing is costing some votes and that is therefore the job of the leadership to put an end to it. We must not give in to this blackmail. Were one to give in to the initial blackmail, more of it would follow. Once the government gets some wind behind it again, and the reason why it does not have any now is primarily the SPÖe...

PROFIL: ...Because, according to Sinowatz, it is "lethargic, too negligent, and has too little initiative"...

Steger: I do not want to make any negative comment about Sinowatz, but I would like to note that the FPÖe has not had any problems at the government level. What we have to offer and what needs to be offered is to see to an intellectual airing again in this country being administered by management and labor. To break up structures. One should get some air to breathe again, without any constraint for a grand coalition.

PROFIL: The Carinthians say that Sinowatz and Steger are condemned to failure. It is the head of the fish that starts to stink first.

Steger: I am firmly convinced that nothing stinks at the FPÖe. Even though some people try to devalue the reputation of the Liberal party leadership, and very consistently at that, I am prepared at any time to subject myself to the

judgment of the electorate. Incidentally, as has been broadcast on TV, Steger, with 37 percent, is clearly doing better than the FPÖ when it comes to public support.

PROFIL: Why did non-Socialists need to go in for the Steger venture in the government? After all, the SPÖ from the start took away the air you needed to survive. The anti-Dallinger Steger was no more than an episode. In the question of the store-closing hours you came a cropper. What is left?

Steger: What is left is a Liberal amendment of the tenants law. The market-economy energy, export, import, and price policy and a new security concept. On the contrary, the SPÖ is now being blamed for not conducting a socialist economic policy. Surely this reveals our enormous influence. But you are right: the SPÖ has also given us trouble. In the affair over Frischenschlager's handshake with Reder, segments of the SPÖ tried to discredit us. People got worked up over the attitude of Frischenschlager, who was born after the war, while the SPÖ and ÖVP generously suppressed the Nazi past of comrades of their own.

PROFIL: You have another chance to prove yourself before the election: the questions surrounding nationalized industry. Wanting to gain some votes in the last minute, SPÖ presidential candidate Steyrer is resorting to conventional method, saying that rather than coming out with layoffs enterprises with heavy deficits should continue to be subsidized. What is the stand of the FPÖ on this?

Steger: I posed the question of coalition twice in this government. The first time when pressure was put on us in the nuclear question. We struck to our no and made it. The second time in the questions surrounding nationalized industry. Whenever vital Austrian questions are at stake, I will pose the question of coalition. That is one of them. If what we have prevailed with and what was agreed on with us is now not adhered to, it will be the end of the government. Profitability calculations have priority even if this leads to the loss of jobs in nationalized industry. I support any chairman of the board if he does what corporation law demands of him. He has to see to it that his company is successful in the foreseeable future--in other words, operates at a profit. There can be no job guarantees in companies operating at a loss; otherwise all of Austria would go bankrupt in the foreseeable future.

PROFIL: Do you expect the election not to take place before April 1987?

Steger: I expect that the SPÖ will do all it can to win the presidential election after all, though the chances are not particularly great. I expect a party reform in the SPÖ, and I expect that there will be an end to the internal FPÖ dispute. Then the wind will be in one's favor.

PROFIL: In the event of an impressive election victory by Waldheim on 8 June, do you rule out the possibility that Sinowatz will resign his office--in other words, that the SPÖ will come up with a candidate for chancellor named Franz Vranitzky or Heinz Fischer for next April?

Steger: All that you have to ask the SPÖ. I know nothing about it.

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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

STUDY PROBES IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO OF CHANGING VALUES IN FRG

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 23 April 86 p 11

[Article by Dr Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann: "A Difference of Opinion with Our Children: One of the Causes of the Success of the Greens"]

[Text] Some time ago in Washington a lengthy discussion ensued on "the Germans and the defense of the West." The discussion concerned the young generation of Germans and their growing animosity toward America. It was obvious that the assembled defense policy experts, scientists and politicians were discussing the younger generations in America and Germany as if the two groups could be expected to have arrived at approximately the same position in life and as if one could assume that they were of similar persuasions.

The results of a survey show how different the situation actually is with regard to Germans and Americans of the younger generation. All we need do is observe the relationship between parents and their dependent or adult children. An international study of value systems at the beginning of the 1980's showed that 18 to 24-year-old Americans and Germans provided entirely different answers to the question, "In which of these five areas do you and your parents have similar views?" Agreement with their parents on moral questions was expressed by 77 percent of the young Americans but by only 38 percent of the young Germans; "in attitudes on religion" it was 69 percent of the young Americans and 39 percent of the young Germans; "in attitudes toward other people" the ratio was 66 to 47 percent; "on political views" it was 47 to 33 percent; "in attitudes toward sexuality" it was 43 to 14 percent. Less than one percent of the young Americans, but 13 percent of the young Germans, said that they agreed with their parents in none of these areas.

Since then new surveys on agreement with parents have been conducted in America and in the FRG. According to a survey by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan, the opinions of parents and their adult children in the United States have grown closer together; according to an Allensbach survey in 1985 they have grown even somewhat farther apart in the FRG. Now 18 percent instead of 13 percent of the young Germans say that they do not agree with their parents in any of the five areas.

In talking about the wide divergence of views between parents and their children in Germany, all sides, both the younger and the older generations, are

quick to explain: That is the way it has to be--children must become independent and disengage themselves from their parents. The fact that human society and human cohabitation are based on values handed down or passed along from one generation to the next seems to have been forgotten. The fact that this disengagement of children from their parents is a matter of degree which must be not too little but also not too much if the value system of a society is to be maintained is a question which has not really been expressed publicly anywhere.

Reversing the natural order of things seems to meet with wide agreement: Parents are supposed to learn from their children. And although parents certainly can learn from their children, this view takes on an entirely different aspect when a society loses sight of the fact that children should learn from their parents.

Thus, parents in Germany have come to believe that it is to a certain extent an intrusion when they attempt to influence the thinking of their children with regard to, say, religion, politics or what they should read. Still considered legitimate are attempts by parents to influence their children's manners. In a 1985 Allensbach survey 73 percent of the parents with children over six years of age said that they attempted to influence the conduct of their children. Only 29 percent still attempted to influence their children's attitudes toward religion and 23 percent attempted to influence what their children read. Twenty-two percent wanted to influence the role models their children look up to and 13 percent wanted to influence their political views (Table 1).

We do not have the results of comparable questions in America. But we do have an indication of how oddly the attitudes toward child-raising in West Germany and America have diverged in their development. At the beginning of the 1980's 46 percent in the FRG and 31 percent in America said that children should be taught at home to be independent and self-reliant. An indication of the divergence of attitudes first becomes apparent when the views of the age groups are compared. In America attitudes varied only slightly between the youngest and oldest groups; 34 percent of those questioned who were under 25 years of age and 26 percent of those who were 40 or older thought that it was a matter of teaching independence and self-reliance. No indication of a process of changing attitudes. In the FRG, however, we observe a growing conviction, increasing steadily over seven age groups, that children must disengage themselves from their parents through independence and self-reliance. Twenty-five percent in the over-65 age group see it that way, but it is 67 percent in the under-25 age group. A movement which we consider universal, which we see as the spirit of the times and perhaps explain as arising out of the changes in living conditions in Western industrial societies, proves not to be universal at all but rather a peculiarly German phenomenon.

Where is it leading? In all of the effort expended on soapbox discussions, symposia, academic conferences, and with journalists always searching for new "questions of the times," the subject of the gulf between parents and children remains strangely unaddressed on an intellectual level. Apparently there is

Table 1 What Parents Want to Influence

Question: "There are some things we try to give our children along the way. In some things we try to influence them and in others we let them have their own way. If you place these cards on this list you will see what is meant."

(A deck of cards is presented along with a list with the two headings, "I try to influence my children," "I let my children have their own way.")

	Parents with children over 6 years old		
	I try to influence my children	I let the children have their own way	Undecided
	in percent		
In their conduct, their behavior	73	11	16
How they handle truth	72	11	17
How they keep their things in order	62	21	17
How they deal with other people	59	20	21
How they work	58	25	17
How they treat those weaker than they	58	17	25
What they do for the family	53	25	22
How they do in school	51	25	24
When they go to bed	44	34	22
What they watch on TV	36	41	23
In their choice of friends	30	54	16
In their choice of clothes	30	54	16
In their attitude toward religion	29	48	23
What they spend their allowance on	27	52	21
What they do in their spare time	23	60	17
In what they read	23	56	21
What role models they have	22	51	27
Political views	13	56	31
What hobbies they have	11	69	20

Source: Allensbach Archives

an inability to imagine the direct results of such a gulf, the lack of orientation which arises when there is no faith in a parent's judgment and when parents themselves make no attempt to provide orientation--the lack of a spiritual and emotional foothold for the children.

When young people have no orientation or security at home, they seek it outside of the family--because they need orientation and warmth. Foreigners are fascinated with the Green Party in the FRG because for them such a party is something entirely strange and, within their own parliaments, inconceivable--a party with two-thirds of its voting members under 30 years of age, three-quarters of them unmarried and representing half of the under-30 age group who are still secondary and post-secondary school students or apprentices.

Based on the peculiar direction taken by the FRG, however, such a party is easily explained; it is a party which reflects the "us" thinking of the younger generation, separating themselves from their parents' generation in



the form of protest and utopia. The connection is evident. In 1985, 32 percent of the young people under 30 who did not have similar views to those of their parents in any of the five significant categories leaned toward the Greens: 23 percent of those who agreed in at least one category, 13 percent of those who agreed in two categories and 9 percent of those who agreed in three to five categories declared themselves for this party.

The changes in values and in particular the change in attitudes toward work have certainly attracted much attention in the FRG and have been discussed in detail. But scarce notice is taken of its relation to the gulf between parents and children--be it cause or result. Tradition breaks down over the whole spectrum of the value system when parents and children grow farther apart on significant views. In terms of work orientation this fact cannot be overlooked. In answer to the question, "What time do you enjoy most, the time you are working or the time you are not working, or do you enjoy both equally?" which has been used to observe changes in values since the 1950's, 60 percent of the young people who agreed with their parents in three to five significant categories answered, "I like both equally," (or in isolated cases "I prefer the time I spend working"). In the case of agreement with their parents in two categories 46 percent still say, "Enjoy spare time and work equally." In the case of agreement in one category it was 37 percent and with agreement in none of the categories 34 percent.

The lack of orientation which necessarily arises when there is a gulf between parents and children leads to basic feelings of fear or scepticism. The antidote is supplied by the kind of protest behavior which provides orientation in the form of opposition to everything which meets with approval in the general population and also in their parents' generation: work is devalued when industriousness is required; there is no desire to get ahead when getting ahead is a traditional goal; when time is short in the grown-up world, living according to the maxim, "We have plenty of time;" when comprehension is highly rated, placing more faith in judgments based on feelings; when Western civilization is based on optimism, belief in progress and appreciation of technology, showing pessimism and animosity toward technology; when the leading political figures are in general all male, oppose them with an all-female leadership.

This pattern takes on significance in terms of defense policy when it includes opposition to the FRG's policy of political alliances, its ties to the West: neutrality and openness toward the East. This is the point where all of the playful, incalculable, colorful characteristics attributed to the Greens break down. No generalization can be made about them, they often say--north or south, they are different everywhere, deeply divided by the schism between fundamentalists and realists.

With regard to the question of Western defense policy, however, the picture is entirely one-sided. What appeared initially at the beginning of the 1980's to be a position held by fringe-groups of the Greens--opposition to German membership in NATO, in favor of neutrality between America and the Soviet Union, in favor of unilateral disarmament--became increasingly evident as an avant garde type of role. On each of these questions the younger generation of Germans increasingly went over to the viewpoint of the Greens, and ultimately a sizable portion of the population moved in this direction.

In 1981, 53 percent of the people in the under-30 age group within the Greens voted in favor of membership in NATO. In 1984 it was only 23 percent. Among the younger generation in general support for German membership in NATO fell from 70 percent to 52 percent and in the overall population over 16 years of age from 78 to 61 percent.

With regard to German foreign policy--closer ties to America or to the Soviet Union or equal ties to both--16 percent of the Greens in 1982 and 15 percent in 1986 voted for closer ties to America; within the younger generation in general, support for this position in the past four years had declined from 43 to 26 percent and in the total population over 16 years of age from 52 to 32 percent by January of 1986 (Table 2). In 1982, 58 percent of the Greens recommended unilateral disarmament--in 1985 it was 74 percent. Within the younger generation those favoring unilateral disarmament increased from 44 to 55 percent and within the total population over 16 years of age the increase was from 34 to 45 percent. We are in the midst of a trend.

Table 2 An Entirely Different Foreign Policy

Question: "A very general question concerning German foreign policy: Should we in the future cooperate equally closely with America and Russia or more closely with America or more closely with Russia? What do you think?"

	Population as a whole		Under-30 age group as a whole		Adherents of Greens	
	June 1982	Jan. 1986	June 1982	Jan. 1986	June 1982	Jan. 1986
	in percent					
Closer ties to America	52	32	43	26	16	15
Equally close ties to Russia and America	39	54	47	55	69	65
Closer ties to Russia	1	2	1	3	2	6
Undecided, no opinion	8	11	9	16	13	14

Source: Allensbach Archives

For experts who deal with questions of Western defenses, how close or distant young people are with respect to the views of their parents is not a subject of interest. In view of the malleability of the views of young people who distance themselves from their parents, however, it could be argued that the gulf between parents and children ought to be among the parameters of defense policy which are constantly monitored.

The rise of the Greens in the FRG is explained in numerous ways, but the connection between it and the unnaturally great distance between parents and children continues to go unnoticed. Even the fact that this distance is unnaturally great is met with doubt. But it can be proven that up until the mid-1960's there were scarcely any differences between the older and younger generations in terms of party preference. Even today, the kind of differences we find in the FRG are not encountered in any neighboring European countries or in America.

What is said and written about the Greens in Germany largely fails to touch on their role in the transformation of attitudes toward the policy of political alliances. Instead there exists the widespread view that the Greens are already a nearly outdated political phenomenon--that the under-19 age group is turning away from it. The party is aging--the number of older members increasing. Broad-based opinion polls do not confirm either view.

In 1982, 38 percent of the Greens were 30 years of age or older; today it is 33 percent. In the last quarter of 1985, 10 percent of the 25- to 29-year-olds declared themselves "Green," as did 18 percent of the 21- to 24-year-olds and 25 percent of the 16- to 20-year-olds. The attraction of the Greens as a party which gives young people a feeling of belonging remains undiminished. The great importance of the educational system in providing new members also remains unchanged. Fourteen percent of the young people who have successfully graduated from a vocational secondary school, and 22 percent of those who have graduated from more advanced high schools are voting for the Greens. Thirty-two percent of male college students and 44 percent of the female college students currently declare themselves voters who favor the Greens. This can probably no longer be considered a marginal phenomenon.

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POLITICAL

FINLAND

# CONSERVATIVES' CHIEF HOLKERI READIES PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY

Helsinki SUOMEN KUVALEHTI in Finnish 30 May 86 pp 26-31

[Interview with Harri Holkeri by Timo Anttila at the Bank of Finland]

[Text] Harri Holkeri is making preparations to be the Conservative Party's presidential candidate for the second time, but he is still setting down conditions for his nomination. The 49-year old Holkeri is not interested in second place for the second time in an election campaign. "I am not interested in Paavo Vayrynen's support figures. I am interested in the lead the incumbent president has, and whether it is possible to catch up."

In this interview Holkeri finally discloses the premises of the forthcoming election campaign and the methods to be used by the Conservative Party. The declarations are conditional even though Holkeri's candidacy is already a foregone conclusion. Formal decisions on his candidacy will not be made until after the parliamentary elections.

"I am not foisting myself upon the Conservative Party as its presidential candidate," states Harri Holkeri immediately at the beginning of the interview in his office at the Bank of Finland. He himself knows, however, that there is really no room for any denials. In the final count it will be difficult to say no since the Conservative Party is appealing to its former chairman's sense of duty.

Holkeri says that being a candidate and coming in second in the last presidential elections have not left any scars. "Perhaps with hindsight it can be said that Koivisto's election was relatively fortunate. However, this does not mean that Koivisto should be reelected."

Many leading politicians in the Conservative Party are of the opinion that the party should hasten to nominate its presidential candidate. Otherwise, Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen, who is to be officially named the candidate of the Center Party in June, will acquire too great of a lead.

"I would not be concerned about Paavo Vayrynen," says Holkeri. "If a situation were to arise in which there would be two candidates in the final vote, Koivisto will not be running against Paavo Vayrynen."

Holkeri has not yet declared his intentions as to whether he will aspire to become the Conservative Party's presidential candidate. According to a public opinion poll published in AAMULEHTI in March, he is the unconditional favorite of the Conservative rank and file. Nearly half of the Conservative Party's active members would be ready to nominate him immediately as their presidential candidate. Mayor Raimo Ilaskivi, who has been mentioned as Holkeri's competitor in past years, remained as the mayor of Helsinki in the poll.

In addition, the party's most visible politicians have publicly taken a position in favor of Holkeri's presidential candidacy. Party Chairman Ilkka Suominen, among others, has declared Holkeri as his favorite.

"I cannot take a position on the presidential candidacy until I am asked. The other side of this issue is, of course, the matter of when I will be ready to allow these people to ask this question. I am rather certain that the situation will calm down in the minds of many during the summer and this debate will be conducted in the fall.

"At that time I will also reserve for myself the right to say no if those fundamental conditions which I attach to the job are not satisfied. So far I have only heard a report on the presidential matter from the party leadership and I have stated that I had nothing to note in that respect."

#### A Real Candidate

According to the regulations of the Conservative Party, a presidential candidate is chosen by a party congress. Even Holkeri, however, admits that this time a party congress will be too late, in Oulu in June of next year. The Center Party's candidate, Paavo Vayrynen, will become the official candidate a year earlier, next month in Lappeenranta, and Vayrynen's actual presidential race began some time ago already.

"Two circumstances must be separated from each other in this matter. The de jure nomination of a presidential candidate and the de facto nomination. The Conservative Party will in fact nominate a presidential candidate already before the parliamentary elections. The party congress will officially nominate a presidential candidate later."

In order for the use of such an actual candidate to succeed, the candidate himself must also behave as a real presidential candidate. Even though Holkeri has not aspired to be in the public eye in recent years, a less intelligent person could think that his statements are exactly like the ones a de facto candidate should make.

"I would, indeed, consider that the election campaign has not yet begun. I am not even a candidate yet."

#### A Regrettable Trotting Race

However seriously one may take the conditions set down by Holkeri for the Conservative Party, it is in any event clear that he now wants a different kind

of election campaign than last time. Indeed, his election campaign could not be accused of any irrelevant actions last time, but in Holkeri's opinion more attention should now be given to the major policy lines.

"Last time the election situation was exceptional since the previous president's term was interrupted. The election campaign became such a breathless sprint and the whole thing was a kind of commercial hustle. Now it is a question of at least a middle distance election race. In this sense these elections will also become more relevant in that larger principles relating to the future of the nation will be debated."

Holkeri is irritated by the manner in which the presidential elections have been recently treated in public. In his opinion, presumed and possible presidential candidates have been treated in public as trotting horses, on which bets can be placed. The impression is that the presidential elections are a form of entertainment.

"It is a question of major issues in the presidential elections. Guidelines for the future are debated in them, and they are not just a form of public entertainment for a certain period of time. And the parliamentary elections are not entertainment either even though there is a certain hullabaloo about them as the result of 200 MP's being elected.

"If I have anything to say about it, the subjects of debate in the next presidential elections will be more intellectual and reflective of more profound principles than what has been heard so far. Issues rather than names will be discussed. This kind of an election campaign is one of those fundamental conditions which I will stipulate for the Conservative Party."

#### Guardianship Must Be Abandoned

One of Harri Holkeri's major election themes is a guardianship society. The same issue which was debated in Sweden, for example, in connection with the last parliamentary elections. There, indeed, the Social Democrats, whose hallmark is a guardianship society, won the elections.

"Here in Finland we are too much under the spell of the race for a standard of living," explains Holkeri. "When this country's welfare system was developed after the war, an appalling guardianship mentality has also become connected with it over the years. A reduction of this guardianship and an increase in people's freedom of action now need to be subjected to a thorough debate."

In Holkeri's opinion, the industrious, energetic, and ambitious person should now be proclaimed as a social model. There is much good in the Soviet concept of a hero of labor in his opinion. A lesson should be learned from this in Finland also. Instead of the guardianship and punishment system, a reward system should be created for society.

"I would also try to find something like a new patriotism even though this may now appear to be exactly like the blue and white Harri Holkeri. It is, however, a question of adopting a serious attitude at the emotional level, and



not a question of any kind of passion connected with a sports match between Finland and Sweden. Nationalism should in many ways be placed on a healthy foundation.

#### Center Party's Discount Store

The Conservative Party has been in opposition for the last 20 years. Now, however, it has been observed that the Conservative Party has an excellent opportunity to break this spell. The party would certainly be able to be a part of the government to be formed after next spring's parliamentary elections if it would promise to support someone else's candidate in the presidential elections.

At least, this has been the thinking in the Center Party, whose candidate, Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen, would not be able to succeed against President Koivisto without the support of the Conservative Party. A coalition government with the Conservative Party would be beneficial for the Center Party in the sense that it would be easier to make Vayrynen the prime minister a little less than a year before the actual presidential elections.

The speech delivered by Vayrynen at a meeting of the Center Party's delegation at the end of April has been seen as open attempt to buy Conservative Party votes. "They set up quite a discount store, indeed," says Holkeri. "I do not believe that anyone will fall into that trap. I, on the other hand, am proceeding from the premise that the presidential elections and the Conservative Party's government question are not to be contingent on each other. I will not under any conditions agree to the rules of the game which would be applied in that particular game."

[Question] Is this to be construed as an actual precondition for your candidacy?

[Answer] Indeed, it is one of the important preconditions, and there are, of course, others. But the office of the president of the republic or even the aspiration to it or the existence of a condition cannot be combined as the purchase price of tactical positions for such short-term goals. The government is always the butterfly of the day, which attaches itself to those issues which each day brings with it. On the other hand, the president's duties entail serious far-reaching questions of the future.

The Center Party is not the only party that has wooed the Conservative Party. Recently, the Social Democrats have also made approaches to the Conservative Party at least in speeches.

Holkeri complains about Vayrynen's haste in entering the presidential campaign. According to him, by nominating Vayrynen as its candidate the Center Party prevented the possibility of fielding a joint candidate among the bourgeois parties. Holkeri does not say from where this joint candidate would have come since such a candidate has never been found before.

"If the Social Democrats were to woo the Conservative Party and thus reject the Center Party, then their speeches about cooperation would, indeed, rest

on their own merits. The same in reverse also applies to the Center Party. Such a game is only worth the paper it is written on. I do not believe that the Conservative Party would be enthusiastic about being a pawn in a game between other parties."

According to Holkeri, the Conservative Party will go into the government when the time is ripe. Offers of cooperation from other parties are becoming more genuine the whole time in his opinion.

#### Dark Horses Must Be Prohibited

In Holkeri's opinion, the entry into the presidential game is complicated by the fact that it is not yet known in what manner the president will be elected. The constitutional reform submitted by the government is to be debated in parliament, but its fate is still uncertain at this time. In the reform of the presidential election method contained in the bill before parliament there are points causing friction between the Center Party and the Social Democrats.

According to the reform, citizens would be able to directly elect a presidential candidate on one ballot and an elector on another ballot. If no presidential candidate were to receive the majority of the votes, then the electors would resolve the issue by an electoral vote. The parliament to be elected next spring should make a final decision on the fate of the reform, and at this time there is no certainty the method of electing a president will be reformed.

"If we go into the elections with the old election system, then we should make certain that dark horses cannot be discussed even in a theoretical sense. I am now speaking from the point of view of democratic hygiene. One should not even think that at this level of enlightenment the opinion of the electorate could be ignored by pulling out of the closet some individual who has been outside of the election campaign. In my opinion, any and all deals connected with the presidential elections should be prohibited."

In fact, in the last elections already Holkeri demanded of the electoral college a commitment that under no conditions would it vote for a so-called dark horse. In Holkeri's opinion, all the candidates should demand a similar assurance in the next elections also if the present election method is still in effect.

"In my opinion, the last presidential elections concluded fortunately in the sense that the result was clear in the first vote already. Thus all the wheeling and dealing was eliminated. Koivisto received a dream of a start."

#### Koivisto Cannot Refuse

Holkeri considers the nomination of Koivisto as a candidate self-evident. "He cannot fail to run. The Social Democrats have invested so much in him that under no conditions can he refuse the candidacy. This is my understanding."

Holkeri does not want to begin criticizing Koivisto. He emphasizes that he wants to be unconditionally correct with respect to the incumbent president at least until the election campaign begins in earnest.

However, Holkeri believes that some of the supporters of bourgeois parties who voted for Koivisto are disappointed in the president's performance. In addition, one should not attach too much importance to the Gallup polls in his opinion. "A couple months before the last presidential elections the Gallup polls promised much less support for me than what I actually received in the elections. This allows one to believe in the fruitfulness of an election campaign."

The whole time Holkeri emphasizes that the election campaign has not yet begun. However, he admits observing that President Koivisto has recently participated more actively in domestic policy.

"He has issued several visible statements in which he has taken a stand. It is, perhaps, permissible to deliberate what conclusions can be drawn from this."

#### Positions Are Becoming Clear

The plays in the presidential game are gradually falling into place. Harri Holkeri is, in fact, already the Conservative Party's presidential candidate, and the only primary candidates of the elections yet to be nominated are the candidates of both left-wing parties.

Holkeri will probably begin his actual election campaign next fall. Too long of a wait could have made the Conservative Party's rank and file nervous in that they have followed Center Party Chairman Paavo Vayrynen's well orchestrated election campaign with concern. Before the publication of this interview some doubt was expressed in the Conservative KARJALAINEN newspaper regarding the credibility of Holkeri's presidential struggle.

The Conservative Party is using the same tactics as the Center Party in the naming of its presidential candidate. First, it is given to understand that the candidate will someday declare his intent to be a candidate, then he will be presented as the party's presidential candidate, and, finally, he will be chosen as the candidate at the party congress. Officially, even Paavo Vayrynen will not be the Center Party's presidential candidate until after the Lappeenranta party congress to be held in June.

After Holkeri's announcement we have only to await President Mauno Koivisto's announcement. Does Koivisto want another term or not. President Koivisto said in an interview with SUOMEN KUVALEHTI in January that he will postpone his decision far into the future.

It is surmised that Koivisto wants a short election campaign. He does not want to put himself in a situation in which all of his official actions will be examined as part of the election campaign. Whether he unwillingly ends up in such a position is a different matter.



The Social Democratic presidential candidate is nominated by the party council, which convenes twice a year according to the regulations. Before it nominates Koivisto as the candidate of the Social Democratic Party, a delegation comprised of its most prestigious members must go and ask him.

Kalevi Kivisto was the presidential candidate of the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] in the last elections. On the basis of recent discussions it seems increasingly apparent that Governor Kivisto will be nominated the SKDL's presidential candidate this time also. The selection will take place next year.

#### Koivisto Is The Favorite of The Gallups

On the basis of the most recent opinion polls President Koivisto will be re-elected if he wants another term. For example, according to a poll published by the KALEVA newspaper in the middle of May, Koivisto is supported by 57 percent of the voters.

On the other hand, the proportion of those satisfied with Koivisto has continually declined according to the same poll. Koivisto's support will also quite certainly decline from the figures quoted in the KALEVA poll when the other presidential candidates begin their campaigns.

This is what happened, for example, in the last elections, in which Koivisto received 144 electoral votes with 43 percent of the votes. The result was especially impressive, but Koivisto received noticeably higher figures in various Gallup polls only a few months before the elections.

Second place in the last elections went to Harri Holkeri, who received 58 electoral votes, five more than Dr. Johannes Virolainen, the Center Party's candidate at that time. Third place in the last elections was taken by the SKDL's Kalevi Kivisto, who received 32 electoral votes.

The positions in the next elections are still overshadowed by the uncertainty of the election method. However, it has been calculated in several parties that the elections will probably be conducted by the old election method. In the last elections Koivisto received the unconditional majority of the electoral votes in the first round already since the Socialists and the majority Communists among the SKDL's electoral college members transferred their support to him. The SKDL moved to support Koivisto even the first time around in the final vote.

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POLITICAL

FINLAND

# SKDL CHAIRMAN SAARTO COMMENTS ON EXPULSION OF STALINISTS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 5 Jun 86 p 9

[Article: "Taistoites Out of SKDL Group Today"]

[Text] The SKDL's parliamentary group will convene today on Thursday to expel 10 minority Communists.

The group's 17 majority Communists have demanded in writing that the minority members resign from the shadow organizations established parallel to the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] and commit themselves to the decisions of the group's majority. The Taistoites [Stalinists] have been given 2 weeks which to respond. The time limit expired a week ago.

No decision, however, was made on expulsion at last week's meeting since Veikko Saarto, the group's chairman, among others, was on a trip at the time.

Saarto will be present on Thursday, and there are no other issues on the agenda than the demand presented to the Taistoites and the response received.

In their response the Taistoites have made it understood that they do not intend to resign from the parallel organizations, which they consider to be in accordance with SKP policy.

Chairman Veikko Saarto does not see that the majority has any other possibility than to exclude the minority members from the work of the group. However, he does not want to engage in the public washing of any dirty political linen in parliament.

"We (majority members) will make our own decisions from now on. Our relations with all parliamentary groups in the future will be the same," he stated on Wednesday.

According to MP Esko-Juhani Tennila, the minority members have not yet decided who will be elected to the leadership of their group. "Somehow, of course, matters will be arranged," he said on Wednesday.

According to Tennila, the expulsion of the minority members is yet another step toward weakening the left-wing workers' movement.

In his opinion, it is especially sad that the expulsion was introduced into the group from the outside, the SKP's majority leadership. "We have been able to function with complete unity for 3 years without any difficulties," stated Tennila.

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18 July 1986

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

## SPECTER OF CONSERVATIVES ENDING WELFARE KEY TO 1985 VOTE

## First Election Postmortem

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 May 86 p 6

[Article by Sven Svensson: "First Election Postmortem. Right Wing Specter Helped Socialists"]

[Text] The right wing specter saved the Social Democratic government in the 1985 Riksdag election. The Research Group for Social and Information Studies makes this statement in the first election postmortem.

The analysis is published in book form by the Tiden publishers with the title Textbook for Politicians.

The two socialist parties received 50.1 percent of the votes in the election, as opposed to 48.9 percent for the conservative parties.

The Social Democrats declined by 0.9 percentage points to 44.7 percent. Torsten Osterman, who is the author of the postmortem, maintains that the loss was due mainly to non-voters, while the conservative parties' losses were more moderate.

His statement is based on voter replies to the following question:

"How would you have voted if you had been sure that the Moderates would have had a relatively minor influence in a conservative government?"

The answer is that 12 percent of the social democratic voters and almost 20 percent of the non-voters (the total of the non-voters is about 10 percent) would have voted for the Conservatives.

Osterman says that he cannot calculate exactly either the size or the direction of any errors, but even if only half of the respondents had made good their intentions to vote for the Conservatives, it would have been sufficient for a Conservative victory.

During the 1985 election, the conservative parties made great gains among the first-time voters. In terms of all the voters, 3.7 percent voted for a conservative party, 2.3 percent for socialist parties.

Even if the figures contain errors, Osterman states that if the trend among the young voters continues for a few elections, it may mean that the political climate in Sweden will be changed in a conservative direction for many years to come.

#### Last Week

Osterman bases his analysis on the previously known fact that more and more voters decide how to vote during the last week before the election, but that the uncertainty is mainly a conservative phenomenon. It is primarily those who have changed parties or allegiance, the young voters, the lazy ones and the ones least engaged politically who are late in making up their minds.

In the 1985 election the change in the party-political picture was especially great. Of the roughly 14 percent who voted for the Liberal Party, 40 percent reported that they made up their minds during the last week before the election or even on the day of the election. When uncertain voters were looking for assistance, Bengt Westerberg, the Liberal Party leader, arrived at the right moment.

Among the voters who made their decision during the last week before the election, the balance between negative and positive opinions were more than twenty times more favorable towards the Liberal Party than the Social Democrats or the Moderates.

Even though Bengt Westerberg inspired a lot of confidence, it was the Liberal Party's stand on the issues that tipped the scales, even though, generally speaking, its policies were unchanged in comparison with previous years. Consequently, it was primarily the voters' perception of the Liberal Party characteristics that had changed.

#### Liberal Party More Clear-cut

The Liberal Party's affiliation with the conservative block was perceived as more clear-cut than earlier, and the opinion that the party was vacillating back and forth has started to disappear. Another incentive for the votes was the fact that the voters had the impression that the Liberal party listened to ordinary people.

The other parties' profiles were mainly unchanged. Both the Social Democrats and the Moderates are perceived as representatives of authority with subtle differences.

The Center Party, which was the big loser in the election, shows an unprogressive profile, on the whole. The change during the election campaign was primarily that the Center was perceived as a more and more faltering party.

The greatest difference is that the Center, in previous elections, managed to draw the undecided voters, while in 1985, the party ran into overwhelming competition from the Liberal Party and Bengt Westerberg.

The cooperation with the Christian Democratic Union, however, does not seem to have affected the election losses to any greater degree.

The Research Group also tried to determine which election issues were the most important to the voters.

#### **Wage Earner Funds**

Among the conservative voters, the main issue was resistance to the Wage Earner Funds and after that the economic policy.

At the same time, only twenty percent of the socialist voters feel that the Wage Earner Funds are of great importance.

Osterman says that the Wage Earner Funds is one of the Social Democrats' greatest information-political failures. He adds that the Conservatives did not succeed in utilizing their opinion advantage since the voting was not affected.

Families with small children were a handicap to the Social Democrats during the election. Those families constitute one of the groups where the Social Democrats have lost the most voters between 1982 and 1985.

#### **Alternative**

The investigation maintains that a majority within all the voter groups feels that children are best off with their parents. Therefore, most of the voters want an alternative to day-care. The conservative demands for child-care assistance are making inroads in the social democratic voter ranks.

The investigators describe the narcotics policy as a social democratic powder keg. The overwhelming majority of the voters would like to see a ban on the consumption of narcotics, which the Social Democrats so far have opposed.

The Social Democrats' trump card in the election was the security issues. Among those voters who considered those issues important, 72 percent voted for the socialist parties in the latest election. However, it seems that the equalization policy, viewed in a historical perspective, is losing ground among the voters. The share of voters who agree with the statement that the equalization of income ought to be carried further has dropped from 80 percent in 1970 to 58 percent in 1985.



### Liberal Party Gains Analyzed

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 1 Jun 86 p 2

[Editorial: "Liberated from Right Wing Specter"]

[Text] The voters' great interest in the issues was a deciding factor behind the success of the Liberal Party in the 1985 election. Bengt Westerberg's ability to present the Liberal party's position was important especially to those voters who were late in making up their minds. From this followed also that the voters, to an ever increasing degree, perceived the Liberal Party as a party that listens to ordinary people and that its policy is aimed at the individuals.

The election postmortem recently published by the Research Group for Social and Information Studies (FSI) in "Textbook for Politicians" (Torsten Osterman, author), is of interest far beyond the party headquarters. Before the next election we can expect more parties to follow the Liberal Party's recipe for success and, hopefully, to contribute to giving the political debate a more issue-oriented touch. Or at least give it the appearance of doing so: the FSI study shows that, on many issues, the parties are far removed from the political opinion and that they keep the loyalty of the voters in part because their message has not struck home.

It is still remarkable how the luminosity of the Liberal Party could increase so drastically in just a couple of weeks, in spite of the fact that the party's stand on the issues actually had not changed. The voters stuck to their earlier opinions about the other parties; although more voters than before felt that they knew that the Moderates want extensive social changes and a greater share felt that the Center appears to be faltering. The enormous social democratic election campaign contributed to the mobilization of their sympathizers but it could not prevent the support of the youngest voters from remaining remarkably weak.

The FSI study reconfirms that the Social Democrats' election result is due mainly to how well this mobilization succeeded during the election campaign, social democracy is hurt primarily by a large share of non-voters. The flow of voters from one political block to another is relatively limited, more important, even in the 1985 election, was how first-time voters and people with weak party allegiances were voting.

Somewhat surprising, therefore, is the result of the investigation that indicates that as much as twelve percent of the social democratic voters were prepared to vote for the Conservatives had it not been for the fear that the result would have been a government dominated by the Moderates. The information should be taken with several grains of salt, but if only one-third of these undecided voters had actually voted for the Conservatives, the result would have been sufficient to effect a change of government.

It can be said, without exaggeration, that the right wing specter stood the Social Democrats in good stead and also that many Moderate Party sympathizers turned away from their party during the course of the election campaign. What is notable in the investigation is how many of the convinced conservative

voters view the Moderates and the Liberal party as equal, generally speaking, while other voter groups think they see considerably greater differences between these two parties. One conclusion is that the advance of the Liberal Party constitutes a considerably greater threat against the social democratic government, than the former rise of the Moderates ever did.

We have to go back to the 1976 election campaign to find a situation where an opposition leader could convince social democratic voters to change party; the success of the Moderates in 1979 and 1982 was mainly due to votes from other conservative parties. It is not difficult to gain the impression, from the FSI study, that there actually exists a political issue which could very well become a conservative winner in coming elections: the family policy.

There is hardly any other area where the voters are so united in wanting a change. The predominance of the group that wants alternatives to communal child-care is overwhelming even among social democratic voters; it was also among families with children that the Social Democrats suffered losses in the latest election. According to the FSI study, however, the voters really do not know what the conservative parties want to do to promote alternatives—a natural reflection of the fact that the three parties have used family issues to snatch voters from each other.

Consequently, the first place position is not at all decided. The Social Democrats are well aware that this is their weak point and have, at least to several of their own voters, made the extended parent insurance appear as the requested alternative to communal child-care. The conservative parties still disagree and one decade of three-party arguments about family policy can, without difficulty, turn into one more.

But the FSI study demonstrates that the results of the next election is not as decided as it may have appeared during the last couple of months. There is still the chance to make politics exciting.

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POLITICAL SWEDEN

DAILY PONDERs TASKS OF NEW CENTER PARTY LEADER KARIN SODER

PM231104 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 18 Jun 86 p 2

[Editorial: "Karin Soder's Task"]

[Text] There can be no doubt at all that things will go well for Karin Soder personally as party leader. A Riksdag deputy since 1971. Party second vice chairman. Foreign minister. Party first vice chairman. Social affairs minister. It is an experienced politician who has now become party chairman.

But will things also go well for the Center Party? Will Karin Soder be able to bring order to the confusion of views which has come to characterize the Center Party--and not just the picture of the Center Party--in the last few years?

It is easy to confuse the tributes now being showered on Sweden's first woman party leader with support also for the policies which she and her party represent. It is true that in 1985 691,258 voters still voted for a Center Party candidate list, although probably a little over 100,000 of them were really voting for the Christian Democratic Coalition, but losses in the major population centers were on such a scale that the party now to a very large extent has the profile of a rural and agricultural party. If the Center Party is again to be able to play a central role in Swedish politics and not to appear a party of distinct regional policy representing particular interests, it must take account of changed economic and technological realities in a way that it has not done so far in the eighties. It has been difficult to know where the Center Party has been going on tax policy, for example, mostly because the party has been unable to put forward credible long-term objectives for its economic policy.

Since it left the government the Center Party has instead sought to associate itself again with the "environment message," which undoubtedly had much success during the Social Democrats' most insensitive technocratic and centralist period in the seventies. But up to now the Center Party has been unable to explain how its ecologist aims can be achieved in harmony with technical, industrial, and economic development.

Even though there are many Center Party members with great insight who realize that a strong market economy is the foundation of success in the efforts in the environmentalist direction advocated by the Center Party, other Center



Party members--including some in prominent positions--see an opposition between economic development and strength and environmentalist measures.

Lending credibility to the Center Party's environmentalist endeavors without falling into dirigiste and centralist solutions will be Karin Soder's greatest challenge in the period leading up to the 1988 election. The unanimity which characterized the party leadership election should make it easier for her to pursue a rational line on this most central of all Center Party issues.

Few people need doubt that Karin Soder has an insight into problems and interconnections. But--once the chorus of praise has fallen silent and the Center Party delegates from the Fyris Hall in Uppsala are once again dispersed across the country--will the unity within the Center Party also prove to be a mandate for Karin Soder to speak for the Center Party without any disagreements? Or was the adulation in Uppsala just playing to the gallery after many years of political trials for the Center Party?

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POLITICAL

SWEDEN

## CHERNOBYL HAVING EFFECT ON DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE

### Communists Seek Antinuclear Front

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 2 Jun 86 p 15

[Article by Kaa Engberg: "Nuclear Power Elimination. VPK Seeks New United Front"]

[Text] It is possible to eliminate the entire Swedish nuclear power by 1990. That is the opinion of the Left-Wing Communist Party. It is now actively trying to effect a united front similar to the so-called public campaign before the vote on nuclear power in 1980 in order to force a more rapid elimination of nuclear power than the one targeted for the year 2010.

This was made clear at a press conference last Sunday, when Lars Werner, the VPK leader, reported on a three-day meeting held by the party leadership of VPK with nuclear power as the main issue.

VPK together with the Center Party formed the nucleus of the resistance to nuclear power before the referendum. The two parties were united in the so-called Line-3 movement. They are also the two political forces that are now breathing life into a new public campaign resulting from the Chernobyl accident. There has already been some communication between VPK and the Center, which has manifested its agreement with a so-called reservation on the nuclear power issue. Approaches have also been made to the large number of people who oppose nuclear power within the Social Democratic Party, but this week the Social Democratic Women's League and the Brotherhood voted for continued operation at Barseback.

### Broad Front

Assistant Party Leader Viola Claesson pointed out that the front for a more rapid elimination is already broad. At the first meeting on May 20, seventeen different environmental organizations were represented. An equally large gathering is expected at a second meeting in Stockholm on Monday.

Party Secretary Kenneth Kvist even expressed the hope that the "united front" would be able to agree on an alternative elimination plan, in spite of the

fact that there are different views on the speed of elimination. On the part of the Center there has been talk about speeding up the elimination and have the matter settled within ten years. VPK and several environmental organizations are of the opinion that it can be done still more rapidly, before 1990.

#### No Support for Physicians

The VPK leadership demanded in a statement that Barseback and Ringhals 2 be closed at the rate of at least one per year. Considering the high levels of radiation in Uppland and Gavle, Forsmark should be rapidly eliminated. The party leadership, consisting of 30 members, also demands a halt in the export of nuclear power and that Sweden act for international elimination of nuclear power.

In a second statement it was explained that the VPK does not have any sympathy for the physicians demands for higher wages and their strike. Those in the upper bracket have already been favored by lower taxes on their increased earnings. Increased real wages for low and middle income groups must have priority. It also demanded solidarity between private and public employees and that the Factory Confederation lockout, supported by the Swedish Employers' Confederation, should be repelled.

#### Center Party Poll Victor

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 2 Jun 86 p 15

[Report by the Press Wire Service, Inc.: "Despite Decline in SIFO Poll, Liberal Party: 'It Looks Very Good'"]

[Text] "This looks very good."

Peter Orn, the Liberal Press secretary, has this somewhat surprising comment on the SIFO poll results, which show a decline of four percentage points for his party.

"We must not forget that we are still four percentage points above the elections result. Since the election there has been some turbulence in public opinion and this decline does not come as any surprise. All along we have taken the figures that say over 20 percent for the Liberal Party with a grain of salt. We still do not know where we will end up," says Peter Orn, who does not believe that there is a Chernobyl-effect in the SIFO figures.

"I really doubt that there is such an effect. Of the two parties that demand a rapid elimination of nuclear power, one is advancing, the other is falling behind."

#### Center Party Advance

In the first opinion poll after the nuclear power accident in Chernobyl, the Center Party is advancing. SIFO's May poll shows an increase for the party of 2.5 percentage points to 11.5 percent. The figures include, unchanged, 1.5 percent for the Christian Democratic Union.



At the same time, the Moderates are noting an increase for the first time since May of 1985. The increase is 1.5 percentage points to 17 percent. Consequently, it is the Liberal Party that has lost where the other two conservative parties have made gains. The party loses all of four percentage points and gets 18 percent.

The block situation is unchanged with 52 percent for the Socialists and 46.5 percent for the Conservatives.

The Social Democrats noted a unique upswing after the murder of Olof Palme, all of 6 percentage points and the increase continues in the May poll with one percentage point to 48 percent. VPK gets 4 percent (-1). Other parties get 1.5 percent, while 5.5 percent returned blank ballots or did not name a party.

The poll is based on 1,942 interviews conducted from May 7 to May 27.

Bo Toresson, the social democratic party-secretary, sees economic and energy policies as reasons for the party's increase.

"The long-term effects of our economic policy is reflected here. Furthermore, we have taken seriously the concern that most people felt after the nuclear power disaster in Chernobyl and we have taken the necessary action. There is great confidence in our energy policy," says Toresson.

#### Focus on Nuclear Power

The Center Party sees the Chernobyl accident and the ensuing nuclear power debate as a partial explanation for its increase of 2.5 percentage points in the latest SIFO poll.

"The fact that the focus is again on nuclear power is partially but not entirely the reason," says Party Secretary Goran Johansson.

"The Social Democrats are not going to remain on the high level that they reached after the murder of Olof Palme," says Johansson, who sees the Liberal Party decline as a result of the fact that the party "has ended up outside reality, not only as far as nuclear power is concerned, but also in the tax debate and the ideological debate."

Georg Danell, the Moderate Party secretary, attributes the latest SIFO figures (1.5 percentage points) to the debate about the nuclear power accident in Chernobyl.

#### Intense Debate

"Considering the recent intense debate, it is surprising that the two parties that are demanding a rapid elimination can only gather 15 percent," says Danell.

"I believe that the increase for the Center Party would have been considerably greater if the party had not entered into an agreement with the Social Democrats on the planning and building acts. The party would then have gained

even more from the Chernobyl accident." The upswing of his own party was expected by the Moderate Party secretary.

"We have felt this. Our campaign has brought results. Of course, it is not good that the Socialist majority is unchanged but the Moderates must first get their own affairs in order, then we can try to increase the credibility of the Conservatives."

Lars Werner, leader of the Left-Wing Party which, according to the SIFO poll, has declined to a critical 4 percent, is not worried.

"This has always been the case, when the Social Democrats are doing well, we do not. And now the Social Democrats are doing well, so the low figure does not come as a surprise."

But Werner believes in another rapid upswing, not least because the party wants a rapid elimination of nuclear power.

A party must have at least 4 percent of the votes in order to be part of the Riksdag. The Christian Democratic Union has less but was admitted through cooperation with the Center.

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MILITARY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

## STEERING COMMITTEE DETERMINES EFA CONFIGURATION

Rome IL TEMPO in Italian 24 May 86 p 13

[Article by Giuseppe D'Avanzo]

[Text] Now that the overall configuration of the European Fighter Aircraft (EFA) has been defined, Italy, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Spain will get down to building it so that it will be operational before 1995, replacing a number of jet aircraft (F-104, "Phantom," "Mirage," et cetera), which are already obsolescent.

Sitting in Munich, the "steering committee"—all the delegates to the armed-forces summit meetings of these four powers ratified the approval announced by the "board of directors" representing the air forces concerned, on the aircraft project hammered out amid much feverish excitement by the aviation industry over the last few months.

In the complex procedure of these major international programs, this means that, once a few minor details, mainly regarding on-board installations and equipment, are ironed out, by next September the technical performance standards relating to the EFA will have been completed and the completed package will be submitted to ratification by the defense ministries: that done, the way will be open for the start of the development phase, whose first major accomplishment will come in 1989, when the first prototype takes to the air.

Why all this talk about redesigning the project? Three years ago, when France was the only member of the "EFA Club," France's representatives were insisting on an aircraft with a gross weight of less than 9,750 kilograms and with a relatively modest diameter. Back of the French demand lay the concealed intent to block adoption of a jet aircraft specifically designed to optimize its performance on defense missions, and, instead, to develop a "multi-purpose" plane suitable for export as a fighter-bomber to Dassault's traditional customers.



When France pulled out of the "EFA Club," a trend set in toward making the craft so much heavier as to arouse concern, which alarmed the Federal Republic of Germany most of all.

That was the motivation for asking the competing companies to go back to the drawing-board for a second look at the whole design, whose architecture—a twin-jet single-seater "canard" with its air intake under the fuselage—remained substantially unchanged (with the exception of the air intakes' supersonic configuration), while the hull diameter was narrowed and the gross weight held within the specification limit of 9,750 kilos.

Singled out for review were the "fly-by-wire" components (electronic rudder controls), while the propulsion system was replaced by a turbo-jet system (of a totally new design by Rolls Royce, MTU, and FIAT Aviation; when the option lapsed on the Americans' General Electric F-404, with its converging-diverging jet exhaust section, with whose increased weight (a tad over a quintal) coupled with lower fuel consumption and, when necessary, higher speed capabilities (the maximum more than twice the speed of sound) contributing to solution of the initial weight problem.

The engine's thrust will be about 10,000 kg.

At the steering committee meeting Italy was represented by the deputy chief of general staff for Aviation, Gen Cresto Gargioli, delegate from the national armaments directorate (Adm Porta), seconded by Gens Andrea Fornasiero and Severino Giorgi. The Italian delegate on the board of directors is Gen Antonio Rossetti, who heads the logistics division of the Air Force general staff.

On paper, this will be an international corporation (perhaps to be called Eurofighter and consisting of Aeritalia, Germany's MBB, and Spain's CASA) to build the EFA, while, as was already done for the Tornado, it might turn out to be a NATO agency ("NAEFA") to negotiate the technical, contractual, and administrative aspects.

As of now, EFA production will be parcelled out, allotting 165 EFAs for Italy, 144 for Spain, 250 for the United Kingdom, and the same number for Germany; development costs to be paid by Italy are currently placed at around 2 trillion lire, while the cost of the aircraft when operational is reckoned at about 40 billion Italian lire.

EFA is the biggest aeronautical program ever taken on by Western Europe: called for are supplies of French and American components and it is possible that The Netherlands may decide to join the Club. At the latest board meeting, Germany announced that it would no longer consider an alternative project with the United States (Dornier-Northrop).

The program does not provide for specific specialist responsibility for the individual participating companies. Both in political circles (mainly on the part of Undersecretary for Defense Bartolo Cicciniardini) and that of Gen Cottone, chief of the Aviation General Staff, the ceiling of 165 EFAs is deemed totally inadequate to our national air defense requirements, which they calculate are going to require one aircraft for every 20,000 square kilometers of national territory and waters they must protect.

As for what it is going to cost to develop the EFA, designed for prolonged surveillance cruises and hence capable of refuelling in flight, Italy will put up 21 percent, Spain 14 percent, and the United Kingdom and the German Federal Republic 32.5 percent each.

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CSO: 3528/154

MILITARY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

**FIRST EUROPEAN MILITARY HELICOPTER**—Europe will soon have its own helicopter. Italy, Great Britain, The Netherlands, and Spain have signed a commitment to build the new aircraft, to be called TONAL, and will be completely designed by Italy's Augusta. Costs of research for the new helicopter will be borne primarily by Italy and Great Britain (38 percent), while The Netherlands and Spain will contribute 19 and 5 percent, respectively. Initial estimates put the volume of sales that will be generated by the new European military helicopter at 6 trillion lire. [Text][Rome TELEINFORMATICA 2000 in Italian 24 May 86 p 2]6182.

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

# ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION POSSESSES MOBILITY, PUNCH

Herford KAMPFTRUPPEN/KAMPFUNTERSTUETZUNGSTRUPPEN in German 26 Mar 86 pp 16-18

[Article by Karl Josef Muench: "Organization, Equipment and Tasks of the Armored Reconnaissance Battalion"]

[Text] The armored reconnaissance battalion is a unit whose forces and resources are used in a special way to support the mobile battle command by performing reconnaissance tasks. Reconnaissance is the most important command resource in the direction of combat, particularly in the case of the outnumbered defender.

The attacker dictates the place, time and area of concentration of his attack. Early discovery of these parameters requires a comprehensive and effective reconnaissance contingent which can perform reconnaissance tasks at any time and under all weather conditions, and which must be able to keep in contact with the enemy, exercising influence over his actions if necessary.

The solution to these many-faceted and complex tasks requires the grouping together of different reconnaissance resources, with emphasis on technical resources, but most importantly including armored ground reconnaissance forces. It is only with the help of these forces that the commander, in a highly mobile and flexible way, is able to obtain more than intermittent information about the enemy at any time and under all weather conditions, and to simultaneously influence the actions of the enemy in the enemy's own location. "/The units of the armored reconnaissance contingents fulfill their reconnaissance objectives as required by the larger units to which they are attached primarily through observation. Their reconnaissance objectives are achieved through clandestine reconnaissance or, when necessary, through combat." AnwFE 700/108 Ziff. 901, March 1984./

## Organization of the Armored Reconnaissance Battalion and Equipment Used

The command level of the armored reconnaissance battalion is the division, within whose area of responsibility the battalion achieves its reconnaissance objectives through clandestine reconnaissance missions or through combat reconnaissance using light or heavy reconnaissance patrols, or reconnaissance patrols reinforced by units of the light armored reconnaissance company. In addition, the reconnaissance patrols can be supported by radar patrols of the



division's own radar platoon -D- which is subordinate to the armored reconnaissance battalion.

The battalion control and supply facilities are grouped together in the headquarters and supply company. The battalion commander has available to him in motor vehicle group I the LEOPARD I battle tank for the mobile headquarters and the light support reconnaissance patrol LUCHS in the liaison detachment.

The second and third companies are the heavy armored reconnaissance companies, each of which comprises two heavy reconnaissance platoons made up of two heavy reconnaissance patrols, each with three LEOPARD I battle tanks and one battle tank for the company commander. These two companies, together with the heavy reconnaissance platoon of the fourth company, establish the decisive combat capability of the battalion.

In the fourth, mixed armored reconnaissance company the light reconnaissance platoon incorporates the quick and silent reconnaissance element of the battalion with four light reconnaissance patrols, each with two LUCHSES. In addition, a brigade reconnaissance platoon with four light LUCHS reconnaissance patrols and one FUCHS armored personnel carrier as a command vehicle are attached to each of the second through fourth companies.

The fifth company, the light armored reconnaissance company, primarily serves the armored reconnaissance battalion in accomplishing infantry-related objectives, particularly in support of the armored reconnaissance patrols in forested and densely populated areas.

It is broken down into a combat command unit with one FUCHS armored personnel carrier and three armored reconnaissance platoons, each of which has three FUCHS armored personnel carriers.

The armored personnel carriers are not battle vehicles, but rather are used exclusively for the transport of the armored reconnaissance troops. These troops are issued small arms, small antitank arms and one MILAN per platoon which can be used either on the armored personnel carrier or dismounted.


The armored reconnaissance training company attached to the armored reconnaissance battalion trains the LEOPARD and LUCHS gunners for the battalion, the armored reconnaissance troops of the fifth company as well as the entire pool of drivers for the battalion.

#### Principles of Use of the Armored Reconnaissance Battalion

The primary task of the armored reconnaissance force is to acquire reliable reconnaissance information, especially about the enemy, with regard to his type and strength, his combat organization and his behavior, as well as his direction, speed and his areas of concentrated movement.

The armored reconnaissance battalion performs its mission through clandestine reconnaissance and/or combat reconnaissance. The battalion commander decides in each case in which of these ways the mission shall be accomplished.

Figure 1. Organization of the Armored Reconnaissance Battalion



The classical form of reconnaissance through the use of reconnaissance patrols is clandestine reconnaissance which is carried out in accordance with the motto "see a lot without being seen."

For the reconnaissance patrol, this means

- engaging in armed combat only for purposes of self defense,
- attempting to keep from being seen by the enemy both while moving and while stopped in order to achieve the objective of the reconnaissance task while remaining undetected.

Light or heavy reconnaissance patrols can be used to fulfill objectives of clandestine reconnaissance, as can reconnaissance patrols which are reinforced by units of the light armored reconnaissance company. Light reconnaissance patrols are the units of choice in many cases because they are quick, quiet and amphibious, and are equipped with long-range radio equipment. Instances in which light reconnaissance patrols are most often used are:

- making initial contact with the enemy,
- taking advantage of gaps in the enemy's defense,
- covering great distances quickly, and
- when the overrunning of enemy positions is required.

Of course, all of the above tasks cannot be performed by the battalion's five light reconnaissance patrols alone over the entire breadth of a division -- the lack of sufficient light reconnaissance manpower forces the battalion

commander to

- use light reconnaissance patrols only in specific areas and for certain of the above tasks,
- keep one patrol in reserve in spite of the small number of light reconnaissance patrols, but
- also to use heavy reconnaissance patrols in clandestine reconnaissance.

Heavy reconnaissance patrols are used by the battalion commander above all

- to provide support for the advancing light reconnaissance patrols,
- to concentrate reconnaissance efforts among light reconnaissance patrols already in place,
- if the disadvantages of heavy reconnaissance patrols (noise, speed, shorter radio range) make them only slightly more favorable in comparison to the advantages of the light reconnaissance patrols, or if reinforcement of the heavy reconnaissance patrols by units of the light armored reconnaissance company or radar patrols help to offset the above disadvantages,
- if it is possible that a transition will be made from clandestine reconnaissance to combat reconnaissance.

Light and heavy reconnaissance patrols are reinforced largely by units of the light armored reconnaissance company (APC) if dismounted units are necessary for the performance of the reconnaissance mission. This is above all the case if

- reconnaissance must be performed in large localities or forests,
- the use of infantry reconnaissance patrols achieves more and better reconnaissance results, e.g. at barriers and when comprehensive reconnaissance information is required, and
- surveillance is to be performed in broken terrain.

Additional reinforcement can be provided by a mixture of light and heavy reconnaissance patrols and/or support by forward artillery observers.

Clandestine reconnaissance is that type of reconnaissance which has characterized the reconnaissance unit for centuries in a special way: /"Achieve reconnaissance objectives unseen as a requirement for operational success."/ Clandestine reconnaissance therefore requires a completely different way of thinking with regard to armed combat. Armed combat engagement with the enemy, which has been the target of reconnaissance, is only pursued for the purpose of self-defense, regardless of whether or not the enemy is inferior.

This procedure changes completely in /"combat reconnaissance."/ Combat reconnaissance is that type of reconnaissance in which engagement with the enemy is consciously sought, thereby obtaining reconnaissance information or forcing its revelation by the enemy.

Special combat reconnaissance measures are

- the surprise raid,
- the ambush,
- shock unit action and
- attack of a close-range target.

The surprise raid and the ambush require the reconnaissance patrol leaders to be able to detect and quickly take advantage of favorable opportunities given the prevailing conditions; here, the (armored) mechanized cavalry is required. However the surprise raid and the ambush are reconnaissance tactics which can be applied by weak forces deep in enemy territory in order to fulfill reconnaissance objectives. Nevertheless, they require a different type of action and different behavior of the reconnaissance patrol on the field of battle.

Shock unit action and attack of a close-range target, on the other hand, require greater combat force, i.e. from the reinforced heavy reconnaissance patrol to the company, and even up to the armored reconnaissance battalion. These actions require detailed preparation and oftentimes support by combat support units (here, the old, heavy fourth company is sorely missed).

Combat reconnaissance is used primarily to foster observation potential or penetration of enemy territory through attack.

The attack is broken off, however, if the reconnaissance objectives have been met. Therefore attacks aimed at achieving combat reconnaissance goals must always have close-range, limited targets. If combat reconnaissance operations and military attack operations are carried out in like manner with respect to operational sequence and assessment criteria, they differ in the objectives to be achieved. In combat reconnaissance, the obtaining of information is the objective, and fighting, annihilating or destroying the enemy and achieving a limited territorial gain are only the means. Whether or not further advantage is to be taken of a successful operation, and to what extent such advantage is to be pursued, does not fall within the decision-making area of responsibility of the battalion commander, but must be decided upon by his superiors.

#### Use of the Armored Reconnaissance Battalion in the Various Types of Combat

The armored reconnaissance battalion is suitable for use in the different types of combat--primarily to delay the enemy--whereby the organization and equipment of the battalion must be considered when tasks are assigned. When used in combat, the command principles applied are those of the type of combat concerned.

When used in this manner, the light reconnaissance patrols initially engage the enemy, monitor flanks, secure gaps or blockades and untaken areas. The heavy reconnaissance patrols enter into combat in accordance with the principles which apply to tank platoons in this type of combat.

The use of the light armored reconnaissance company (APC) in the various types of combat presents special problems. According to the principles of the motorized infantry unit, this company always fights dismounted, whether as an integral unit or split up to provide reinforcement. The light reconnaissance company must always be supported by units of the armored battalion or additional attached forces particularly when it is used for defense or to delay the enemy in cases in which the terrain provides no special advantage. In such cases, the company's limited infantry movement impedes the speed and mobility of the armored reconnaissance patrol. The armored personnel carrier is not a combat vehicle; it is used dismounted and camouflaged, and kept in read-



iness behind the lines unless in exceptional cases it is used at the front as a weapons carrier for the MILAN. In spite of these limitations, the flexible presence of infantry forces facilitates the operations of the battalion in the various types of combat, above all because they can be used in difficult, covered terrain, and because they are able to establish, take over and disengage barriers deep behind enemy lines.

#### Summary

Even if the armored reconnaissance battalion is suitable for use in the various types of combat as well as in surveillance of flanks and areas of terrain due to its large number of battle tanks, it must not be overstressed. If the armored reconnaissance patrol is worn down in the various types of combat, the ability of the battalion to perform armored ground reconnaissance missions is automatically impaired.

However it is the primary task of the armored reconnaissance battalion to provide decision-making assistance to its superior unit by performing enemy reconnaissance, thus enabling practical use of armored combat troops.

This task is fulfilled by the armored reconnaissance unit using light, heavy or reinforced reconnaissance patrols either in clandestine reconnaissance or combat reconnaissance.

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MILITARY

FINLAND

# SHORTCOMINGS IN CIVIL DEFENSE AIR RAID SHELTER CAPACITY

## Tampere Lacks 12,000 Spaces

Helsinki Helsingin Sanomat in Finnish 31 May 86 p 8

[Text] Tampere (HS)—Tampere has air raid shelters for 93 percent of its residents. This means that in a crisis situation nearly 12,000 Tampere residents will be left outside the door, and the same goes for all strangers.

"We are building apartment house shelters for the residents of the buildings, but no one would be left without shelter. Of course, we don't have shelters for everyone now," civil defense chief Martti Jouttenus dodged the question as to where the remaining people would wind up.

In Tampere people in areas occupied by individually owned homes and townhouses are without their own shelters.

The Civil Defense Board has tried to propose improvement of the facilities, but so far the proposals have not been taken seriously.

Shelters are not being built because they are regarded as unnecessary and as a preparation for war. "A sudden peacetime accident is not taken into account," Jouttenus acknowledged.

In Tampere the situation will be corrected when the Hervanta shelter is completed at the end of the year.

"The theoretical number of spaces will increase to over 100 percent. But it will not, nevertheless, help the single family dwelling and townhouse areas at all, since there is no shelter protection there," Jouttenus said.

## "Appropriations Ridiculously Small"

A year ago the Civil Defense Board drew a map of the most poorly protected areas, which are in Hannala, Petsamo and old Pispala.

Jouttenus said that the most poorly protected areas are clearly marked on the map. "The city should investigate whether there are in those areas stone buildings, for example, on the ground floors of which shelters could be built."

A year ago the map was submitted to the municipal government, which passed it on to the city engineer.

City engineer Kauko Lehtonen feels that the problems of the small home areas are insoluble. "In the old areas cellars could be adequately reinforced, but there are no cellars in the new buildings."

According to Lehtonen, up to now such ridiculously small appropriations have been granted for the construction of air raid shelters that we are ashamed to even mention them.

Four million markkas have been promised this year to put the finishing touches to the Hervanta rock shelter. The Hervanta shelter will be completed this year, at which time there will be standing room for 16,500 people. According to Jouttenus, the completion of Hervanta will not eliminate local problems.

Six million have been earmarked in the town plan for the Nasinkallio construction job next year and 2.3 million for the Keskustori shelter. The Building Department plans to present these sums as such in the budget, but appropriations have in general diminished.

The city's only public toilet and the Traffic Department's coffee break room are under Keskustori. By renovating them, we will get a radiation-proof shelter for 750 people; that is, the cost will be 3,200 markkas per 0.6-square-meter space.

The biggest expense will be the procurement of pressure-proof doors and air conditioning.

The shelter is primarily intended for bus drivers and passengers. It is estimated that 100,000 people a day pass through Keskustori enroute.

Nasinkallio has been excavated, but it will not be completed before the next decade unless construction is accelerated.

There are many semi-excavated hollows in Tampere. Lehtonen listed Nasinkallio, the space under the Amuri school, Harmala and Petsamo. A couple of them were excavated as early as during the last wars, and it would not cost a fortune to put them into shape. "We could get them excavated for a few million; however, finishing the interiors would cost more," Lehtonen said.

#### Trying to Circumvent Construction Code

The best provided for are the downtown and new apartment building areas since they generally have to build shelters into new apartment buildings.

There are, of course, differences in the way areas still under construction are provided for; for example, a small apartment building development is going up at one end of Iidesjarvi without shelters for each building. In this way they are able to keep construction costs down.

According to Jouttenus, all shelters that are built will be efficiently used in peacetime too. In the shelters there are parking for cars, schoolrooms, rifle clubs, hobby rooms and at Hervanta there is a whole world under the rock with its own ice skating rinks and swimming pools.

There are plenty of exceptions to be noted with regard to the condition of the shelters, but even a poorly equipped shelter is better than none at all.

The civil defense people have precise figures on what a given shelter can withstand. "If we want to get full use out of the shelters, we have to keep them in good shape," Jouttenus said.

They judge air conditioning to be one of the worst problems since they consider switching from ordinary air conditioning to a self-contained air conditioning system to be problematical.

The weatherstripping may also be in bad shape. When apartment building association premises were recently inspected, only a few of those buildings older than 5 years could be passed without any remarks. If nothing else was wrong, at least the weatherstripping of the doors was.

#### No Air Raid Shelters at All in Rural Areas

Finland's 2.6 million air raid shelter spaces are in the cities and densely populated areas, that is, in 101 communities. There are no air raid shelters at all in rural areas.

No orders have been given to build shelters in rural areas, nor have overly many been voluntarily built.

In Helsinki there are spaces beyond the needs of the local population. It is estimated that over two-thirds of all Helsinki residents would manage to get to their shelters in 1 or 2 minutes time, even though some people say that the shelters are disadvantageously distributed. They are in need of shelters in the northern part of Helsinki.

Rock shelters account for less than a tenth of all shelter spaces. They are common shelters, but there are entirely too few of them. Most shelter spaces are building associations' own.

"It is the main form of shelter. In what shape they maintain their shelters depends on the residents of the building," Civil Defense Union first secretary Martti Putkiranta said.

Putkiranta said that space in which people occupy themselves and for young people is the best space to use for air raid shelters because then the shelter is immediately available. Even the shelter provided by apartments is better than none at all. In the event of crisis situations houses and cellars are the only shelters in rural areas.



Inadequate air conditioning is, however, the biggest problem with small or flimsy shelters.

### Greater Concern After Chernobyl

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 1 Jun 86 p 2

[Editorial: "Civil Defense's Zero Hour Has Arrived"]

[Text] After the Chernobyl accident everyone realizes that civil defense must no longer be associated only with the dangers created by military conflicts.

And even if the development of nuclear power continues over the years and tempers calm down, the threat of nuclear power will remain and, as things look now, additional construction will mean an increase in threat factors despite safer structures and other safety measures.

There is, however, no question of any sort of panic situation since we now know that the population can be fairly easily protected from even a nuclear power catastrophe if we are properly prepared for it.

Civil defense readiness in our cities is in general acceptable and the deficiencies of shelters can be easily corrected. Our ability to protect small building and rural areas is, on the other hand, inadequate. Farmers still have cellars, but they are generally used for other purposes.

Acceptable temporary solutions to the problem of residents of small buildings must also be found and it would unquestionably further the cause if expenditures employed for building shelters could be deducted from income tax. Government officials' actions and instructions must at any rate be aimed at seeing to it that we can protect every citizen within our means from the most probably injuries caused by radioactive radiation.

Officials will have a big job in organizing protection for schools, offices and especially hospitals and old people's homes in critical situations. Especially in the proximity of nuclear power plants we will have to get ready on short notice, which means arranging areas and actions in order of urgency. We must carefully adapt to guiding alarmed citizens in cities whose safety has been threatened.

In protecting the population the role of shelters and other kinds of devices like measuring equipment is important, but easy to manage: The money is there, as are the necessary materials and labor. With respect to this, it is up to government officials to prove that the requirements for protection exist by increasing appropriations for civil defense.

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MILITARY

FINLAND

#### USE OF HAWKS PROVIDING ADVANTAGES IN FIGHTER COMBAT TRAINING

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 31 May 86 pp 1, 9

[Article by Paavo Tukkimaki: "Air Force Is Testing Training Missile with Hawks"; first paragraph is HELSINGIN SANOMAT introduction]

[Text] The Air Force plans to test a training missile with Hawks. Equipped with these missiles, the planes will go to flight detachments that train fighter pilots.

The Defense Ministry has approved the plan and test flights will probably start within a year's time.

The Air Force is trying to economize. Right now the missiles can only be used with combat fighters in addition to simulators. Flying a Hawk costs only a third of what it costs per hour to fly a fighter plane.

#### Switch from Slow Vinka to Hawk Succeeds Without Incident

They tossed aside part of their daily routine, put on their best face and flew their flags at the Aerial Warfare School in Kauhava when preparations were made to boast about Finnish training of fighter pilots. The new training system, or the direct switch from Vinka basic trainers to the controls of operational Hawks has gotten off to a good start.

The Air Force bluejackets had other new items to offer too. They were now willing to admit that they plan to go ahead and test heat-seeking training missiles that have been procured for combat fighters with Hawks. To start with, they are going to make a trial installation on one plane, by means of which they will determine the difficulties there are in its working with the characteristics of the plane and the training system. Test flights should start within a year's time.

The whole project will involve several planes and they will go to flight detachments in which fighter pilots receive their training.

They are trying to save money, which is always tight in the Army, with the Hawk training missiles. Right now, in addition to providing it with simulators,

training in the use of missiles can only be provided with combat fighters, the flying of which is considerably more costly than with Hawks. An hour's time in the air with a Hawk costs only a third of what it does to fly a fighter plane.

The Hawk's basic weapon is a cannon; in peacetime a machine gun is used on the plane. A heat-seeking missile is, on the other hand, a basic weapon of fighter warfare. It is not felt that there are any foreign policy obstacles to the use of the training missile.

#### Fougas To Be Phased Out in June

They told us about the peculiar Fougas too. When Officers Training Course 70 ends on 4 June, the Fouga Magisters, which will have served for 25 years, will also be transferred to the scrap heap. Two of them will end up as a memorial in front of the Aerial Warfare School mess hall and they intend to keep a few planes in flying condition so that they can be gotten into the air to celebrate the unveiling of the memorial in August.

The Aerial Warfare School assured us that the Hawk — which only amateurs really refer to as the Haukka [Finnish for 'hawk'] — is really a tough trainer. Improvements are, to be sure, being made in the brakes and the nose-wheel steering gear. They do not plan to change the windshield in the Finnish Hawks, although the English are busily occupied with that in their planes. From what we hear, there is no need for doing so in Finland.

According to Aerial Warfare School director Col Jouko Koskinies, there is something at Kauhava that probably cannot be found elsewhere. It is a historical leap straight from a basic propeller trainer to a jet trainer, that is, from the Vinka to the Hawk. Elsewhere, they are in the habit of putting something between them so that future flight officers can gradually get used to the faster speed. In Finland, however, they have decided to economize on just this intermediate stage.

Now they are merely waiting at Kauhava for the news to spread and for curious military representatives to pour in to marvel at the Finns' leap.

The leap was economically planned for a couple of years and, according to Koskinies, the tests indicate that they did not go very wide of the mark. The system works.

There are over 200 flight hours in the training program. Vinka basic training flights take up 45 of them and at that time those whose personal qualities do not in spite of everything indicate that they would make good pilots can also be dropped.

In cadet school or officers training school they begin with the 65-hour Vinka program, which provides the flying experience for switching to the Hawk. At the same time he also told us how the student manages at the controls of a jet trainer. But before he climbs into one of those, he spends 15 hours of flying time in a simulator.

## Thoroughly Familiar with Knobs

They say that the simulator is the whole program from A to Z. By means of it they can fly on the ground, become thoroughly familiar with the knobs and buttons, familiarize themselves with the plane and practice what they cannot in the air: [what to do in] emergencies. According to those who praise it, the simulator is such a great gadget that you can get almost anyone "to drop from the sky" with it.

The device is really overworked; it is in use from morning to night and they have not been able to set aside any time at all for, for example, maintenance operations. If a reel breaks down, they repair it far into the night.

There will be a second simulator within a couple of years to relieve the rush.

The 100 hours with the Hawk includes direction finding, flying blind with instruments, the basics of stunt flying and the simple combinations involved in it, squadron flight (since, as far as we have heard, there has been nothing but talk of solo flight) and a small tactical program in which they are taught how to maneuver in combat and machine-gun target shooting. Otherwise, the tactical program is usually saved for later.

And when they have gotten through all of this, "the boys get their wings and look on themselves as real aces." Before them is a transfer to a flight detachment for additional training.

## History Has Been Made Before Too

When this historical leap was proposed, the heads of the project revealed that it was not so historical at all.

There have been similar leaps before too. From the Stieglitz, dubbed the "Loom," to the Vihuri, from the Saab Safir to the Fouga when there was no simulator and from the Fouga to the Mig when its two-seater version was not yet in use.

There was, of course, another beauty spot in the presentation: a semitrailer full of Puucos was driven past the eyes of the guests.

## First Time in Hawk Spent Chiefly Looking On

Three real gentlemen in their flight overalls stood at the edge of the Kauhava airfield, two of them wearing scarves like in the movies. Is this the life of a future flight officer?

No indeed, cadets Pekka Marjamaa and Jukka Viro as well as student operations officer Pasi Ronkkonen assured us. On the average they go up into the air twice a day; they just happened to be standing there this time in honor of the guests.



The men are members of a group that has jumped from the Vinka to the Hawk via the simulator. The cadets have about 20 hours in a Hawk behind them. As for the student operations officers, they have 40 hours since more emphasis is laid on flying in their training, whereas the cadets are given theory.

The future officers said that their first flight in a Hawk was spent chiefly looking on. At first there was a lot of pressure. Their thoughts pressed them to remain on the ground, even though they were heading for the sky.

"In the plane you are 50-percent confused by the ground," Viro reflected. You are always in a hurry at the controls. "After the slower Vinka, you aren't really able to estimate the time that is required."

According to Aerial Warfare School director Col Jouko Koskimies, it usually takes two or three flights before one gets used to the speed of the Hawk after the Vinka.

The men assured us that you do not think that you are sitting inside a plane worth millions of markkas; your safety is indeed uppermost in your mind.

The men praised their school. The group is a small one, the spirit good and they found no fault with their training either. There is just enough opportunity to fly for there to be a small hunger to do so. Only, one's salary after completion of studies could be larger.

A student operations officer enjoys a monthly salary while cadets are students and receive only a per diem allowance.

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MILITARY

FRANCE

## WEAKNESSES OF MILITARY PLANNING, BUDGET ASSESSED

### Military Effectiveness Debated

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 6 June 86 pp 9-13

[Article by journalists Jerome Dumoulin and Henry Eyraud with Elie Marcuse and Dominique de Montvalon: "France is out of Breath"]

[Text] "There will be a reduction and painful choices which will set our teeth on edge. But the military men expect as much. They are rational. They know well it does not involve our making ourselves loved, but making decisions which have been delayed too long." This high official, close to the Matignon, does not beat about the bush. The defense budget, after years of evasion and pretended indifference must be grappled with, reviewed, corrected and cut down. He adds "the worst thing would be not to choose, to continue to do a little of everything out of fear of the general staffs. We would again be 'naked' in 10 years."

It is a less discriminating language than that of Andre Giraud, but the minister of defense is also on this wave length.

Before the difficulty of technical and budgetary decisions, the two preceding governments lost precious time or made questionable decisions: in anticipating too few investments for 1984 and 1985 and an unrealistic growth in the period 1986-1988; in accumulating about a year of delay with respect to these already unbalanced expectations; in finally allowing the defense effort to deteriorate. "A law which is only window-dressing, inapplicable since this year," says one in the prime minister's circle, in referring to the Military Programming Law of 1984-1988 which Charles Hernu had passed in his time.

Suddenly, Andre Giraud, his cabinet and the chiefs of staff must do everything at once between now and the end of summer: modify defense concepts, select a model of the army for the beginning of the century and develop this new programming law which will lead to it. First, submit a budget request for 1987 inevitably marked by austerity, it is a difficult assignment...

Ten, 15 years: these are from now on the periods which will lead to an armament program. Among military men, tomorrow is the year 2000. An expert explains, "the drama of France is that a large amount of essential equipment arrives together on one's last legs." Namely the 2 antiaircraft carriers, the 30 AMX tanks, the Mirage IV strategic bombers, the Jaguar support planes, two-thirds of the Transall transport planes or the Albion guided missiles.

What will one replace as a priority, in view of a huge Soviet armament effort which does not slacken? At the Elysee, General Gilbert Forray, chief of the private general staff of the president of the republic emphasizes that "the explosion of costs forces us to pass from the era of know-how to can do." The choices are all the more complicated since they are multiplied by the new technologies: "smart" weapons, AWAC radar type planes (indispensable for low altitude aerial reconnaissance), "stealth" procedures, called "furtive" in French (they reduce the plane's radar image), antimissile missiles or even a battlefield range finder. And each time, it is necessary to weigh the consequences on our relations with our allies headed by the FRG.

A specialist observes, "in France, lacking a consistent effort, lacking decisions taken in due course, one organized a fine financial bottleneck for the years 1990-1995." The 10 to 15 most expensive armament programs, which each amount to tens of billions of francs, will not "expire" at the same time. Supported by the three armies, the projects are, nevertheless, very developed and often already obligated; nuclear aircraft carriers, new generation submarines, a future fighter plane, a Franco-German helicopter, ground-air missiles of various ranges, the Leclerc tank, the Helios observation satellite, the SX strategic missile, the Hades tactical nuclear missile etc. A panoply which is apparently justified by the missions and present concepts. The difficulty is that the implementation of all these additional programs will require an effort amounting to 4.5 percent of the GNP. It is an objective which is completely unrealistic without a strong, very improbable growth.

#### Arsenals with Overemployment

Must we consider a review of the traditional missions of our forces? An intimate of Jacques Chirac puts his foot in it. "We are living with a military machine whose missions and facilities, outlined toward the end of the 60's, have never been questioned. In addition, the secondary assignments, entrusted to armies have constantly increased. Today, the 'defense establishment' is unmanageable." Perhaps at the end of the reevaluation in progress, we will move toward a certain reduction of the military establishment overseas and on the oceans. A higher officer of the ground forces sighs, "if it is necessary to eliminate: let us eliminate the 11th D.P. The survival of France is at stake in Europe;" while a commander already resigns himself to the loss of the "strategic base of Noumea"...Other ideas which are asserting themselves today: give priority to armament programs which interest at least two of the three armies, establish a "common source" for planes,

helicopters or missiles and never begin again the stupidity of the Famas rifle. In short, produce in France at exorbitant prices, equipment which you can find at a low price "on the shelf" abroad.

The government also wants to obtain a better profit from the arsenals and armament industries, a sector which is too protected and often in a monopoly situation. A high officer of the ground forces charges: "There is in our arsenals--ours and those of the navy--an incredible overemployment situation. The armament industry employs 300,000 people. There are at least 30,000 too many. And a civilian costs on an average the price of six draftees." Will the government have the political courage to touch the arsenals and other army establishments, pampered by Charles Hernu?

A high official declares, "in the exercise which we have started, we are taking the defense budget 'in pincers': on one hand, the threats, on the other, France's capacities. That assumes a precise analysis, rather than incantatory formulas like 'no foreign mission for France without aircraft carriers'... An approach which arouses, one suspects, the emotions of the general staffs. For they will all be called for the "big report" before summer. None of the major programs will escape reevaluation. The SX missile because Star Wars has affected it: at the horizon of the year 2000, the strategic environment will be in full evolution. The aircraft carrier, because it does not lack critics to condemn it as "a luxury." The tank, because it can provide the opportunity to innovate on the subject of Franco-German cooperation. The fighter plane, finally: it appeared indispensable, but the cost of the new technologies makes it prohibitive, lacking a solution of imaginative cooperation.

According to Andre Giraud, "the keystone of our defense" the force of deterrence is shattered by the technological revolution. At the horizon of the year 2000, our missile launching nuclear submarines, will still be invulnerable, it is hoped. The Albion guided missile, according to the statement of an expert, "still will not have said its last word." But everyone agrees another "component" connected with the national territory is necessary. The ground-ground mobile SX missile has been studied for a long time and could be ready for the appointment at the end of the century. It will cost more than 30 billion francs. But its design itself is questionable, if one believes in the rapid development of ground based ABM systems.

The Soviets have never stopped modernizing their ABM sites around Moscow. They seem to be preparing to extend this network to all their territory and are trying to give an antimissile capacity to some parts of the antiaircraft defense. Is it necessary then to study a new, nonballistic missile--an "extended" firing SX, the cruise missile, a plane-missile combination--in order not to place all the eggs of deterrence in the same basket.

Among the general staffs and among the experts, the most animated discussion centers obviously on the proposal for nuclear propelled antiaircraft carriers. Quite simply because it seems France could, strictly speaking, do without these expensive ships.



One of their supporters declares "an aircraft carrier or rather two aircraft carriers because two of them are needed--runs between 20 and 25 billion francs." One of their opponents answers, "it is a lie, it is more than 50 billion!"

#### Confrontation about the American Raid

Sound arguments are not lacking against the favorite program of the navy: "aircraft carriers play little tricks along the coasts; our planes go everywhere." (The words are certainly those of a flier.) The vulnerability of aircraft carriers has become a major concern: A confidential report recognized, "at the moment they do not have any way to defend themselves against an Exocet type missile." The protection of the Mururoa "laboratory" or the Kourou Space Range--the only very sensitive points of French overseas territories--does not necessarily depend on aircraft carriers. One specialist remarks, "as for the western Mediterranean, the only region where France can seriously envisage important aeronaval operations, it is perfectly covered by planes based in the south of France and Corsica."

What should be given priority in a period of limited resources? As General Schmitt, chief of staff of the ground forces observes: "The sailors tell us that the situation is 'frozen' in Europe and all the dangers come from the periphery. They sometimes forget the efforts which it is necessary to support continuously to freeze this situation in Europe, where the probability of conflict is low, but the risk is major."

The sailors obviously have sharp answers to all this. Admiral Leenhardt, chief of staff of the navy emphasizes the concept of containment: He says, "consider the 'red arrow' circuit: Mozambique, Angola, Aden...and close to us, that of the 'green arrow,' that of fundamentalist Islam." Is not the aircraft carrier, in case of threats to Tunisia, for example, the ideal instrument to handle a crisis? A high socialist official, an enthusiastic advocate of aircraft carriers, declares, "If the American aircraft carriers had not kept up the pressure for a month off Libya and prepared the terrain 'electronically,' the raid of the U.S. Air Force F-111s would not have taken place."

Ah! This American raid...Each one turns it to his advantage in the confrontation of general staffs. The air force declares, "the aircraft carriers have shown their inadequacy." A sailor emphasizes, "the fliers certainly provide the intensity, but our aircraft carriers assure the supply, because we are near." Admiral Leenhardt asserts quietly: "sailors and fliers complement each other. You will not get me to say that one is better than the others." There remains in the mouth of the navy people the least military, the most "sentimental" and perhaps the strongest argument: that of prestige and rank. One of them sighs, "the French Navy without aircraft carriers is another navy. It is perhaps another France."

## The "Sad Minimum" of Planes On Line

Started, like the aircraft carriers, by Paul Quiles, the future tank of the ground forces--the Leclerc, a heavy 50 ton tank, whose prototype is already well advanced--could also be questioned, less for military reasons, than for industrial reasons. The Giat arsenals (an industrial group for ground weapons) are hardly noted for their productivity. And if the French engineers make excellent turrets, the FRG Leopards have always proved to be superior as regards their tracks and engines. Could France conclude a spectacular "deal" with the FRG: French helicopters for German tanks? It is a solution which one dreams of at Rue Saint-Dominique. The ground forces would not necessarily oppose the purchase of the Leopard. But among the armament engineers and the Giat workers, you can already imagine the public protest and the appeal to "patriotism."

You again find these problems of industrial and technological policy in an even more acute form on the subject of the fighter plane. Marcel Dassault's hostility to European cooperation and the reluctance of the Elysee to impose this choice on him explain, to a great extent, that ACE [European Fighter Plane] is being produced today without France. The fact remains that the latter needs fairly rapidly a successor to its Jaguar and finally to its Mirage 2000.

The air force considers the 450 planes on line as a "sad minimum." A higher official explains: "Examine the distribution: 75 planes carrying prestrategic nuclear weapons; 45 on reconnaissance missions; 180 on aerial defense missions; there remain 150 for FATAC, in other words to strike the enemy in his vitals with conventional weapons. Must I remind you that the Soviets produce 600 fighter planes per year?" The air force chief, General Capillon does not hesitate to say that "important things are taking place with planes--it is like that." He explains, in 24 hours fighter planes deploy anywhere in Africa, in 48 hours to Reunion; in less than 4 days to the heart of the Pacific. These are the same planes which could operate tomorrow in the European theatre; the argument of "multipurpose use" is not without weight.

For General Capillon, France must make the future fighter plane. And lacking cooperation, it must do it alone. "Otherwise, we lose out." This is based on Dassault's experimental plane Rafale--which will fly in a few days at Istres--the air force considers it a light twin jet capable of filling several missions at the same time. But there again, each one wonders personally about France's capacity to conduct this major program alone financially, whose total cost could exceed 100 billion francs. What can be done? On one hand, the air force rejects with horror the idea of a modernization (and consequently of an extension to the next century) of its most recent plane, the Mirage 2000. On the other hand, the socialist government has not managed to make up for the failure of the ACE. As for the step taken toward the northern European countries, headed by Belgium and the Netherlands--which will have to replace their American F-16 fighters at the end of the century--it seems to be standing still.

Andre Giraud allegedly had in mind, one says, a sort of consortium inspired by the EURODIF [European Diffusion Agency], which he created lately for uranium enrichment: The associated clients enjoy a certain number of advantages in terms of price, transfer of technology, etc. In this perspective, one can see very much beyond Europe and as far as "new great powers" of the Southern Hemisphere: Brazil or Indonesia, for example...But a surprising hypothesis is stirring aeronautical circles today--it even makes Dassault's hair stand up on end, but General Capillon admits it is possible to envisage it--it is an agreement with the Americans, and more specifically with Northrop. A few "magic" words sustain this approach: vocal commands, counter-measures, anti-infrared and especially stealth, the technology of "furtiveness." The latter makes it possible to give a plane the radar image of a bird. For the Americans already have "invisible" fighters and Northrop is now developing the stealth bomber, the (ATB).

A high official of a French armament plant declares "A Northrop-Dassault agreement assumes the interest of the American producer--he can see the means of getting a foothold in the European market--and the green light of Richard Pearle, the big boss at the Pentagon of the file on transfers of technologies." Meanwhile, it is reported, Andre Giraud has decided to authorize the AEC to transfer to the aeronautical industry the stealth techniques which it has developed for the nuclear warheads of the strike force and which, according to an armament engineer, could be "an interesting basis for our planes and especially our tactical missiles."

A key question is could an experienced, determined minister of defense get innovative ideas accepted in a period of cohabitation, that is to say transition?

The Mitterrand-Chirac quarrel on Star Wars and more precisely on France's methods of participation in the American research program seems largely artificial. Can one imagine that it will capsize the exercise of reflection started by Andre Giraud in giving an emotional nature to that which is only suggestion? According to an adviser of the president who emphasizes the "quality of the personal relations which have been established during their conversations between Francois Mitterrand and the Minister of Defense," it is not very probable.

The fact that the president, in going this week to Coetquidan, had wanted to point out, with a very Gaullist emphasis, his role as chief of the armies and guardian of France's great strategic options, is quite clear. Andre Giraud does not question this role a moment. The directive which he sent, shortly after taking over his office, to the chiefs of staff proves it.

But in "reactivating" the committee of the chiefs of the general staff, which he convokes at very frequent intervals, the minister shows clearly that the governmental authority is presiding over the reexamination in progress and intends to conduct it to its end..Andre Giraud is no doubt anxious to appear before the Council of Defense presided over by Francois Mitterrand

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(and called at his convenience) in a strong position after "locking in" the services. For that reason to say, like one of Jacques Chirac intimates that "the president of the republic will be informed of the results of the governmental deliberation, of which parliament will be the sole judge," shows no doubt a little naivety.

Incarnation of the "nuclear monarchy," chief of the armies, arbiter of the councils of defense, Francois Mitterrand will have his word to say in fall, when the governmental exercise will end. Between now and then, according to one of his advisers, he will let Andre Geraud have his say.

One can only hope that the chief of state does not stray onto the path where the former minister of defense, Paul Quiles, seems to want to lead him: that of an indirect appeals to the generals against the government. Posing as the uncompromising defender of all the military programs pledged, skillfully manipulating the promises of the RPR-UDF platform, cleaving asunder in advance the privatization of some sectors of the armaments industry, in the name (the Gaullists are mine!) of national independence, the predecessor of Andre Giraud gives the impression of wanting to stir up the general staffs against the new minister.

However, in private, the socialist leaders are the first to recognize the urgency of the great choices. "The left could not touch defense, one of them recognizes. Let the right, if it has the courage, adapt our military machine to the needs of the era." In the search for 40 million in savings. The great banker Edouard Balladur will not leave without doubt any other choice to Andre Giraud. But would true courage not have consisted in demanding of the nation a sacrifice for its defense?

#### Aircraft Carrier Construction Questioned

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 6 Jun 86 p 18

[Article by Michel Labro]

[Text] What does the aircraft carrier exactly serve for? LE CANARD ENCHAINE is certainly not the most widely read periodical on the navy ships. But when it appeared, 15 days ago with this provocative headline, the "Foch's" sailors scrambled to get the newspaper. And for good reason! To have or not to have aircraft carriers...That is the real question, both strategic and budgetary which the navy faces!

When they were ministers of defense, Charles Hernu and Paul Quiles had both agreed to build a new nuclear propelled aircraft carrier. Since his arrival in the government, Andre Giraud seems to hesitate. It is a question of large amounts of money and also of priorities. Suddenly, the sailors dread a blow like Trafalgar. And from the top to the bottom of the hierarchy, there is a mobilization in favor of "old tubs" as one says in the naval air force.



A "Foch" officer grumbles, "a fleet without aircraft carriers would be somewhat like the Albion guidance system without its missiles," while before him the 12 tons of a Super-Etendard sweep down on the ship's bridge. There is the roar of jets, the screech of metal and the odor of kerosene...This is the first conviction one experiences on arriving on board: with its 120,000 horsepower, its 2,000 men and its 40 fighter planes--and the tactical nuclear fire in its bowels--the aircraft carrier is a machine, ready for war at any time.

When the French soldiers of the International Forces had been wounded in Lebanon in September 1983, it is from the "Foch" that the four Super-Etendards ordered "to punish" the enemy batteries left. It is again from the "Foch" that a reprisal raid was prepared a few weeks later against the Shiite militia in Baalbek. Commander Phillipe de Linares, the chief of the Super-Etendards asserts: "if France wants to preserve its influence in the Mediterranean, the aircraft carrier is an indispensable instrument."

This opinion is certainly that of all the officers on the "Foch." When the air force sends planes on a bombing mission, they arrive, they strike and then it is over. We are still there. We remain near the coast, we look out, we wait," says Captain Francois Deramond, 51 years old, an official of the aircraft carrier. The sailors are not a little proud of this formidable gift which they then offer their fliers. A veritable base where everything is organized on the basis of flights. Everything: the metal insides of the ship where the planes wait to be raised on the bridge, to the air conditioned levels where the air of the open sea never penetrates or the light of day... And on the orders of the commander, this "airfield" can move to the other end of the globe, a few cable-lengths from the aggressor country. On the sea, there is no Maginot line--even nuclear. Rear-Admiral Herve Le Pichon remarks, "it is you who trace your own frontier yourself with an aircraft carrier."

#### Too Expensive, Too Vulnerable

Why in the devil would the navy renounce today such an advantage? For budgetary reasons? There are some and they are not negligible. Twenty-five years old, the "Foch" and the "Clemenceau" are reaching the end of the line. A mechanic officer explains, "Our boats resemble cars whose engines already have more than one revolution of the counter. One tinkers, one patches up, one has the jitters and bother. Hence the decision of the commander of the shipyards in Brest to construct a new monster of 35,000 tons, the "Richelieu," intended to replace the "Clemenceau," while awaiting the construction of a fourth ship, which is to replace the "Foch." The trouble is that all that is expensive, even very expensive. A nuclear propelled aircraft carrier, with its missiles, its armament and its planes costs about 40 million francs.

Is this the only reason for the present hesitation? No, certainly not. In the general staffs, some doubt the usefulness of aircraft carriers in the future. They are too expensive, too heavy, too noticeable and also too

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vulnerable with this string of ships they must drag behind them to assure their protection. The American raid on Libya has strengthened them in their convictions: after all one called on the F-111s of the U.S. Air Force to do the dirty work and not the navy ships anchored in the Mediterranean.

In the dining room of the "Foch's" higher officers where the comfort of the easy chairs and the cigar smoke recall the atmosphere of some English clubs, the American raid continues to stimulate the conversations. A lieutenant commander assures "the air force lobby in Washington had enough of seeing the navy seize the limelight in the Mediterranean." While another declares: "Without the presence of the aircraft carriers, the F-111s never would have been able to operate safely..."

From the "Foch's" bridge, the commander watches the plane elevator. On the bridge, men wearing T-shirts, whose color corresponds to each one's job, repeat the same movements, with their ears covered with a head-piece to protect them from the noise. Like in a ballet, you see them weave under the plane's fuselages and hook on a sling. And then the din of catapulting, the cloud of steam which the plane leaves in its wake...The commander says, "even when you see this spectacle hundreds of times, you cannot be apathetic about it."

On returning to Toulon, the silence of the navy operational center contrasts with the permanent commotion on the aircraft carriers. Here one records and follows hour by hour the movements of all ships in the Mediterranean. On huge wall maps, little red symbols shaped like rugby balls indicate the positions of Soviet submarines. On that day, 16 May, 6 had been observed, including 2 nuclear ones.

An officer asks, "Do you really believe that it is a good time to strike the flag? Especially since the Russians themselves are soon going to have their first real aircraft carrier..." Another goes one better. "The Americans are not mistaken about it. They began to take us seriously when the "Foch" and the "Clemenceau" assured a continuous presence of 8 months off the Lebanese coast. Are we going to renounce this credibility now?" The navy has chosen. It is already looking lovingly at the "Richelieu."

#### Recent Defense Budgets Analyzed

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 6 Jun 86 p 23

[Article by Francois Lamballe: "Budget: "The Price of Delays"]

[Text] One of the effects of the crisis will have been to lead progressively, especially since 1960 to a reduction of the share of the armies in the state budget: from an average of 17 percent between 1974 and 1980 to about 15 percent today. The discussion about the means of defense has developed around three points.

The overall defense effort is viewed in terms of the percentage of the MGNP. This proportion whose significance has sometimes been criticized, dropped under Georges Pompidou, then had increased from 3.37 percent to 3.67 between 1974 and 1980. Since 1981, it ranged around 3.80 percent with a maximum of 3.92 in 1983. It never reached the objective of 4 percent, which became since the end of the seventies, the promised land of the armies' budget.

The RPR and the UDF criticized this stagnation and advocated in their joint platform a defense effort equal to 4 percent of the MGNP, but without specifics or dates or methods.

In Europe, France continued to occupy a place, with respect to national wealth, at a level of military expenses between Great Britain (about 5 percent) and that of the FRG (3 percent).

The budget structure--which amounts to 15.8 billion francs outside of pensions in 1986--is the subject of a second round of discussion. Three elements seem important:

--The comparison "operational expenses" and "equipment expenses" or "Title III/Title V": has improved in recent years, with Title V (equipment) rising from 45 percent of the total (1980) to 47.8 percent (1986). But troop training and maintenance of equipment would suffer excessively, if you went further. An example often mentioned: that of training air force pilots dropped from 420,000 flight hours in 1980 to 385,000 in 1985. The operational capacity of the armies is in question here.

--The share assigned to nuclear forces indicates the priority given deterrence. Since 1981, it has increased slightly, rising from 30 percent to 33 percent of titles V and VI of the defense budget. However the big programs of the conventional forces have been partly sacrificed. The research-development effort in this field has been left more in charge of armament enterprises. This has weakened them, at the very time when their American competitors enjoyed a reverse development by the Reagan administration.

--In the center of the nuclear package are the "tactical" or "prestrategic" weapons (Hades, ASMP) which have absorbed most of the growth with respect to credits, increasing from 6.2 percent in 1981 to 17 percent in 1986. Paradoxically the budgetary effort was consequently made in this field where the doctrine of deterrence is questioned the most, where the conversations are contradictory and the concepts of use, hesitant. And it is also where the diplomatic consequences, in our relations with our allies, are difficult to control.

The execution of the Military Programming Law is finally the third point of the discussion. The provisions written in such a text are still difficult to observe. The law of 1977-1982 had already experienced, because of an inflation definitely higher than the expectations on the document, sizeable financial reduction and its physical objectives were only partially achieved.

Today the delay involved in the 1984-1988 law is hardly questioned. The Senate calculated it at 12 billion francs at the end of 1985, that is two-fifths of its amount. But this figure does not include fully the insufficient appropriations which hinder the achievement of objectives. The great weakness of the recent period was also the absence of any long range decision supplied with the corresponding credits between 1980 and 1986.

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MILITARY

ITALY

## ELECTIONS TAKING PLACE IN ARMED FORCES

Rome AVANTI! in Italian 16 May 86 p 4

[Article by Daniele Moro, Chief, Defense and Armed Forces Section,  
PSI Executive Council]

[Text] Elections are going on now for the fourth set of representatives of the military, as authorized by PL 382/78. They will affect more than 400,000 citizens.

This occasion presents us with a plethora of food for thought, and we think it timely to translate it into an analysis of a major advance in the democratic coming of age of the nation's armed forces and special corps.

First of all, we think it would be enlightening to underscore the way the fears awakened with passage of the military franchise have proved groundless, and, to a degree, capricious as well, once again demonstrating that democracy and reforms, properly understood and implemented, are never "agents" of confusion, but rather the essential components of societal growth in a state of laws.

Certainly, the disparate perceptions of this innovation show us a path that may not always prove simple, given the matter of this "new thing" itself, but cannot and must not ever be taken as justification for second thoughts or non-participation.

Today the Military Representatives are a permanent institution to which we must look with confidence, accompanied therein by the active and meaningful presence, to the feasible and necessary work of "recording" the assignments and the operative dynamics of the experience, and the day-to-day work can suggest ways to improve their operations.

This is the direction the Socialists are pledged to support toward the experience of innovation and participation that underlie the modern and participatory concept of our country's armed forces.

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MILITARY

ITALY

# DEVELOPMENT OF OWN AWACS BELIEVED POSSIBLE

Rome TELEINFORMATICA 2000 in Italian 16-19 May 86 p 4

[Text] While there is no longer any doubt as to the fact that Italy can be defended from the skies alone, we must bear in mind that the fundamental system for detection and alarm, radar, has lost some of its initial adequacy since the fifties. As a result, an "aggressor" aircraft has a very high probability of being picked up by the defenders' ground radar only when it is too late to take effective defensive measures. The most effective way to right this balance in the offense/defense ratio turns out to be airborne radar. The sophisticated Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS, the United States' E-4B flying at a mean level of 8,400 meters (where it can stay for 16 hours and, with in-flight refueling, 72 hours), illuminates an "electromagnetic cone" beneath itself, whose base has a ground circumference of some 400 km in radius. In short, the sensors aboard an AWACS flying straight down the center of the Mediterranean, with plenty of international water on either side, can spot any attacker approaching the Italian Peninsula or its islands. Along with other European countries, Italy is a partner in maintaining an AWACS E-4B fleet in Europe, but the intervention procedures are such that many nations have taken steps to build their own fleets. In response to the new situation that has emerged in the Mediterranean, Italy, too, urgently needs an AWACS fleet of its own. Our country's industry can do that by equipping the G222 transport with the latest results of advanced electronic research. On that basis, the experts are certain that within a couple of years Italy will be capable of launching an AWACS of its own, compact, economical, and with excellent prospects in the export market. Along with AWACS looms the in-flight refuelling tanker for which an official requirement has already been granted by the Air Force to meet some of the requirements of the new EFA defense aircraft. The Air Force has already picked as its tanker the aircraft derived from the 4-engine Boeing 707 passenger airliner, while Aeritalia has spelled out the necessary licence acquisition for the conversion process. All that is needed now is the political decision.

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**MILITARY**

**ITALY**

**ANTI-TORNADO DEMONSTRATION STAGED AT SAN DAMIANO**

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 25 May 1986 p 6

[Article by Jenner Meletti]

[Text] The Tornado quarters are roomy and rugged. Topping their steel-beamed ceilings is a thick layer of concrete. There are already nine of them bulging from the grassy turf at the sprawling San Damiano military air base. More of them are to be built to house the first wing of 18 Tornado fighter-bombers, expected within the next few months. The work is moving along, as they say, on the double. The defense minister and the government—neither of which has thus far seriously considered or given any but evasive answers to the protests and concerns unanimously voiced by Piacenza province, by the mayors, by the region, and by the PCI. They really are in a hurry: they want to get on with deployment of those Tornados at San Damiano right now. Yesterday, though, construction ground to a halt: more than a thousand boys and girls braved a pelting rainstorm to sit down en masse in front of the air base's four gates, blocking entry to vehicles and men from the companies that have contracted to build the hangars.

Those gates stayed barred until 1300 hours. The Tornado protest picked up and moved on to Piacenza, where there was a protest march and a celebration in Piazza Cavalli that went on well into the night.

Each demonstrator came to San Damiano with his own ideas and his own suggestions, but what they all had in common was a commitment to peace, opposition to ever more costly and sophisticated weapons, and outrage at "decisions taken without consulting the people," especially those who must pay most dearly for such decisions. In San Damiano—and throughout the surrounding territory—the Tornado deployment is particularly threatening because the air base is a scant 17 kilometers from the Caorso nuclear power plant. ENEA some time ago set the "safety limit" at 15 kilometers, but, in the wake of Chernobyl, how can it justify such a "safety margin?" Why choose the same zone to build a nuclear power plant and deploy a bomber group whose cargo may very well be nuclear missiles?

When the rain finally stopped, a blazing sun broke through. By noon there were 3,000 people blocking the gates. Very few slogans: all they needed were their songs, their guitars, being together shoulder to shoulder in front of the gates, to let the world know why they were doing this: the desire for peace, the desire to live and to have a future. The demonstration, sponsored by CRAM (Military Airport Reconversion Campaign) ended with a petition to Parliament to rescind its decision to deploy the Tornados at San Damiano. The first support pledged came from members of Parliament who were present at the demonstration: Raniero La Valle and Giancarlo Codrignani, of the Independent Left; Felice Trabacchi, Mando Montanari, and Lucia Castellina (member of the European Parliament and of the PCI).

The choice of the Tornados as the protest target—Castellina explained—"shows how fine the line has become between conventional and nuclear weapons. We must restate the European security issue in political, rather than military terms." "I think," said Raniero La Valle, that the Tornado base marks another step toward stripping our country of the capacity to take charge of its own destinies. The Libyan crisis showed us that use of military bases is determined by the strongest power, whatever the legal ownership of the bases may be."

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MILITARY

SPAIN

#### UNDERSEA DETECTION DEVICE FOR GIBRALTAR STRAITS SOUGHT

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 9 Jun 86 pp 52-53

[Article by Juan de Dios Mellado and J. J. Tellez]

[Text] The Strait of Gibraltar is the nuclear "street" with the highest traffic density on earth. Beginning next year, the Spanish government wants to control nuclear submarine traffic there.

According to Antonio Ruiz Casaseca, a Gibraltar environmentalist who speaks Spanish with the typical Andalusian-English grace of Gibraltar residents, "they only need to put in semaphores to control nuclear submarine traffic." Since the U.S. bombing of Libya, the Strait of Gibraltar has become a vital area. The Russians, Americans and NATO forces almost have to ask each other's permission to travel through its waters.

Shortly after the collision of the Soviet "Viktor" class nuclear submarine in September 1984 with a Soviet merchant vessel, the "Brastavo," Narcis Serra, Spain's defense minister, said: "In order to defend Spain's sovereignty, we have to know and control what is happening in the Strait of Gibraltar."

At the end of April 1986, another nuclear submarine, this time a U.S. vessel, the "USS Atlanta," of the "Los Angeles" class, suffered considerable damage to its bow during an accident whose circumstances have still not been fully explained.

Repeated protests by pacifists, environmental groups and members of the Campaign Nuclear Disarmament, a large and powerful antinuclear organization in the United Kingdom, have produced nothing but words in Gibraltar. A member of Spain's military intelligence services, which "monitored" what was happening in Gibraltar from Sotogrande (Cadiz), a few kilometers away from Gibraltar, told this journal that for the time being, it is almost impossible for Spain to know what is going on the waters of the Straits.

It is much easier for the United States, though. It has a hydrophone network called SOSUS (Sound Surveillance System), along with the SURTAS (Surveillance

Towed Array System), which is towed by ships and at times can be dropped from the air. Its data are processed by the famed Ilyac-4 computer at the Norfolk, Virginia naval base. Under the surface of the Straits, there are also MAD (Magnetic Anomaly Detectors) and the British system, similar to SOSUS, which Spain could also adopt for its own use.

Spain already has submersible sonars on frigates, fixed sonars and second series submarine sonars, quite similar to those of a static network which, in our case, could be connected with a surface control system.

Spanish military information sources told this journal that by 1988, Spain will have a submarine sonar system that will be connected with hydrophones extending from the Gibraltar and Rota bases.

It is possible that by the beginning of next year the Spanish Navy's Rapid Force may begin to function, using the Rota base in Cadiz as its headquarters. Its flagship will be the aircraft carrier "Principe de Asturias." It will head a combat group composed of destroyers and frigates of the FF-G type, now being built at El Ferrol shipyard. In addition to these ships, the unit is to have SH-CO helicopters outfitted with LAMPS equipment to monitor submarine movements. Spain recently acquired four such units, plus another two without the LAMPS equipment, but which could be refitted at a later time.

"It is within our capabilities and our budget to own and operate this equipment. Even a country like Morocco could operate its own submarine detection service," defense specialists told CAMBIO 16,

Morocco, though, does not seem to have any difficulty finding out what is going on under the waters of the Straits. The United States keeps Morocco informed about that.

Officially, Spain does have access to data of this type received in Rota, either at its express request or occasionally at the initiative of the United States, without a prior Spanish request.

In the case of the Gibraltar base, the United Kingdom is willing to provide all types of information to Spain's defense ministry, but Spain has always declined this offer, for both diplomatic and foreign policy reasons.

After the 1984 Soviet nuclear submarine accident, the Spanish government decided to accelerate its purchase of helicopters equipped with the LAMPS MK-3 system. This acquisition had been planned since the early 1980s. Although at first there was talk of buying 12 units, the system's high price cut that figure in half, and at this time, two of the six helicopters will not have the LAMPS system, though they may be converted in the future,

There is one problem which Spanish defense ministry officials are firmly pointing out: the "Principe de Asturias" carrier flagship is too slow to coordinate all these activities.

Until this plan is in operation, Spain's actual control in the Strait of Gibraltar will continue to be almost makeshift, in comparison with other world powers' modern and sophisticated systems: "Sikarsk" and "Sea King" helicopters, radar and laser surface control systems, six P-3 "Orion" planes based at La Parra airport in Jerez attached to Wing 22 and another eight coastal batteries in the Gibraltar field. Within their range are located electronic intelligence collection and deciphering equipment used to monitor communications.

Spain's coverage of the area's airspace is as limited as its underwater detection capability. It does seem that its systems are to be reinforced, now that certain incidents have occurred, including the alleged violation of Spanish airspace by a Moroccan Mirage F-1 last year.

### Strategic Position

The Straits area is of great interest to Spain's defense system, as the peak of the axis linking the Canaries with the Balearic Isles. It is a key position for any Mediterranean conflict, particularly one involving the northern coast of Africa.

The Libyan-U.S. crisis and the growing tensions in the Maghreb region have made it clear that it is urgent that Spain take action to control the Straits, as a vital link in any Allied conflict with Warsaw Pact members.

The socialist senator, Jaime Perez Llorca, writing in the journal ANDANA published by the Cadiz deputation, wrote: "The strategic position of our province (Cadiz) and its proximity to the strategic spaces of greatest importance to Spain's security today, has enabled our nation, whose defense capability is much less than that of the United Kingdom or of France, to reasonably project a control and defense capability over the Strait of Gibraltar that is superior to what France can successfully exercise, in the defense of its interests, over Central Africa. To defend the Canaries and their communications, Spain can maintain from Cadiz a defense and control capability reasonably superior to what Great Britain can so brilliantly and effectively project over the Falklands."

This context might also include the underlying intent of the META plan or the increase in maritime traffic control to be implemented by 1988, according to present estimates provided CAMBIO 16 by Sen Jaime Perez Llorca.

### Traffic Density

Geological studies being done of the seabed of the Straits by Spain and Morocco, with the idea--which at the present time seems utopian and almost unworkable because of its high costs and risks--of joining the two continents with a fixed connection on both shores, are producing information on the geological makeup of the area. Obviously, this will help to maintain increased and more effective control,

But the Strait of Gibraltar, 12 kilometers in width, is considered a real and dangerous bottleneck, given the high traffic density there. Local pacifist groups have complained that at times submarines are forced to "yield to whoever is passing on the right."

Back in November 1978, the oceanographic ship "Cornide de Saavedra" conducted a series of studies for the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, in which it set the average traffic density of the area at 5,8 ships per hour. This is definitely higher than the traffic density in the English Channel.

But the Spanish officials' concern is focussed primarily on the passage of military vessels, especially submarines of various nationalities, which do not always respect what is called the "peaceful passage" regulation. According to the provisions of international law, this requires that they travel on the surface, displaying their own flag and the flag of Spain while crossing waters under Spanish jurisdiction, and also requires the express authorization of our government to conduct any operation whatsoever.

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ECONOMIC

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

# FINLAND ONLY EXCEPTION TO NORDIC IMPROVING JOBLESS RATE

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 2 Jun 86 p 24

[Article: "Finland Only Exception Last Year, Unemployment Eased in Other Nordic Countries"]

[Text] The number of employed increased in all the Nordic countries in the second half of last year. According to statistics published by the Nordic Countries Statistical Secretariat, the number of employed increased the most in Denmark and Norway.

A considerable increase in employment in private service areas such trade, hotels and restaurants, transportation, and banking, was common to all the Nordic countries. These areas grew rapidly particularly in Finland and Norway.

Industrial employment increased in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, but decreased in Finland.

The number of employed increased in public administration and services in all four countries. The specific reason for this could be found in an increase in the female labor force.

The number of unemployed decreased in the second half of last year in comparison with the corresponding period of the previous year in all the Nordic countries except Finland. A total of 55,000 less unemployed than in the previous year was recorded in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway.

Only in Finland did unemployment increase slightly especially among older males. Unemployment among youth was reduced in the Nordic countries with the biggest reduction occurring in Denmark.

Finland's unemployment rate was 6.1 percent in the second half of 1985. The lowest unemployment rate in the Nordic countries was in Norway and Sweden, where it was 2.5 and 2.8 percent respectively.

Unemployment continues to be the greatest in Denmark where unemployment was 8.2 percent. In Denmark and Norway more half of the unemployed is comprised of women.

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ECONOMIC

BELGIUM

SOCIALISTS' SPITAELS CRITICIZES MARTENS AUSTERITY PACKAGE

Brussels LE SOIR in French 31 May/1 Jun 86 p 2

[Interview with Mr. Spitaels, Belgian Socialist leader, by Guy Depas, Guy Duplat and Jacques van Solinge of LE SOIR, date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] You have had the opportunity to say all the bad things you can think of about Martens' budget plan, in particular in an advertisement published in our paper. Isn't there a single provision that is positive in your opinion?

[Answer] Yes. There are in fact too many hospital beds.

[Question] No other examples?

[Answer] You only asked me for one. Let's stop there.

[Question] Do we or do we not need to save 200 billion in 2 years?

[Answer] The issue is not knowing whether or not we need to save this money but determining whether or not it is possible to do this. Politics does not fit in the framework of Kantian philosophy and leaves little room for moral duty. In addition, I have noted that the president of the FEB, Mr. Leysen, recently stated that Martens has already twice started out to reach his goal of budget reform and that, like a high jumper, he has only one try left. When I hear the reservations of the CSC, I doubt that he will reach his goal.

[Question] But all the same don't public finances influence our future to a significant degree?

[Answer] This is important. But after 5 years in power this administration has so tired out public opinion that it is more difficult now than it was in 1982 to resolve the problem. I feel sorry for Martens' successor, who will find a very difficult situation in terms of the nation's finances, while the people will be truly exhausted by the sacrifices and restrictions.

[Question] But let's be specific! For example, aren't there savings to be made in education?

[Answer] Yes, particularly in the area of school construction, but only as long as the whole sector is financially balanced. I believe that the Catholics got the best of it because the cutbacks will only affect the fund for state, provincial and community schools.

[Question] No other savings are possible?

[Answer] Maybe. But besides school construction, salaries make up the bulk of the education budget.

[Question] Would a single system be a savings?

[Answer] We can join the infrastructures but in this, our country, it is impossible to merge the two systems.

"I Will Not Say So"

[Question] Can the PS give general figures for its budget alternative?

[Answer] No. I will not do that. I am not the prime minister. I am not holding the cards. This is not the moment to offer an alternative program because a majority just voted its confidence in the Chamber.

[Question] Doesn't such a response undermine the credibility of the PS?

[Answer] If that is so, then the same is true of Rocard and Barre in France. Has Houthuys told you what he suggests in place of the 17 points in the government's plan which the CSC has rejected?

[Question] Your reply is a bit glib. In 1960 the Left fought the single law before applying it partially.

[Answer] I will respond today that it is not a question of us making cuts in the railroads and education and causing 25,000 government jobs to be lost.

[Question] What is your analysis of the labor situation?

[Answer] I see things concretely as they actually are in the country—in Hainaut, in my city of Ath. This movement comes from the people and not from union organizations. In my city, the people want Martens' skin. Those who think that the unions thought out the plans and those who think that the political parties control these activities are making a monumental error. In many places the workers do not follow the unions' orders. They do not want to go back to work. The entire history of labor activity in Belgium illustrates this: every time, members have triggered an action, not the leaders.

[Question] And the attitude of the PS?

[Answer] We understand and approve of these strikes. But we refuse to give any instructions. After all, we are not the ones who risk losing a sizable portion of our salaries.

[Question] Will the agitation continue after Saturday's demonstration?

[Answer] I did not say that. But I do not think that the Christian unions in education and communications are inclined to continue their activity into June. As for the FGTB, it will be necessary to try to reconcile the desire to maintain pressure on the government and the CSC with the financial disadvantages of a very long strike.

[Question] How many demonstrators are you expecting Saturday in Brussels?

[Answer] It is very hard to give a figure because I don't yet have all the information. For example, at the moment I do not have any information on the degree of activity of the SP.

#### Pressure

[Question] The SP has been surprisingly discreet in the political discussion of these past few weeks. But what is the real goal of Saturday's demonstration?

[Answer] A movement cannot live unless it has confidence in itself. We will be elbow-to-elbow, PS and SP, "friends and enemies" as I have said, unions, mutual societies and cooperatives. This will be a demonstration of our strength as well as a getting together. It is very important to present an image of unity as we look toward the dates for future events. Last 13 October our movement did not reach its goal because it gave a divided image on several points. The other goal of the demonstration is to put pressure on those in politics. I am not being polemical when I say that, since the beginning of the strikes, the CSC has reached the point of stating that 17 items in the government's plan are unacceptable. The demonstration could accentuate this divergence.

[Question] Martens and Gol are right in saying that you want to obtain through the strike what the voters refused to give you.

[Answer] The prime minister has the habit of justifying everything by what happened in the past. For 4 years he blamed everything on what he inherited from the Socialists. Now he is hiding behind the results of 13 October and has forgotten his slogan, according to which three-quarters of the path has been traveled. It is true that a demonstration does not change the majority. But it can cause shock waves which can modify the government's behavior. That is why we are trying to get the CSC to adopt a more decisive tone.



[Question] Why do you always talk about the CSC?

[Answer] I think that the position it took Tuesday evening is an important event. Martens told the RTBF that he believed he had a majority within the Christian worker movement. But this movement has just decisively refused 17 important points. Martens is caught in a vise. If the government gives in in any significant manner to the CSC's claims, then Martens' credibility is jeopardized and Guy Verhofstadt loses his reputation; the liberals will be humiliated. If Martens does not give in I see two possibilities: either the CSC implements its threats with action and problems begin for Martens, or the CSC does not react and the labor elections of 1987 are liable to be a second defeat after those of 1983.

He Will Not Pack His Bags

[Question] Your reasoning seems implacable. But aren't you underestimating the ability of the Belgian system to find a middle way?

[Answer] The measures that have been announced are clear and precise. Everyone can judge whether they are put into effect or not. We will see who wins. The liberals have already pocketed a lot of insults. They are certainly anxious to remain involved but they cannot take just anything.

[Question] Do you think the Martens government will fall?

[Answer] I'm not saying that Martens will pack his bags tomorrow. But his good image is liable to decline considerably.

[Question] You talk a lot about the CSC but at the same time you remain exclusively linked to the FGTB.

[Answer] It is true that we have a joint program. It is a moderate program but we do not consider it a Bible. If others have good ideas (and I am thinking of some of the CSC's proposals to encourage employment), then of course we can discuss them.

[Question] Is another coalition possible? It would be hard for us to see you aligning yourself with the liberals.

[Answer] History is often surprising and I do not like to make predictions. However, it is true that the current labor situation would make it difficult for us to get along with the liberals.

[Question] Are you still a candidate in the Walloon region?

[Answer] As much as I do not question the national majority, I contest the regional majority. It is intolerable to see the farces that result from this obstination of wanting to govern with a majority. I know that you have to be careful with opinion polls, but if these were right we could pay back the PSC and the PRL in their own coin and manage the Walloon region with just the Ecologists.

[Question] Do you still say that you will not be part of the Walloon regional government without being part of the French community government?

[Answer] Yes, because the people, who already have a difficult time understanding our setup, would not understand that we would be in the majority in the region but in the opposition in the Community.

Candidate? Under Normal Conditions, Yes

[Question] Would you agree to a merger of the regional and community institutions in exchange for becoming part of the two governments?

[Answer] I have noted that in 7 months the PRL and the PSC have done less to bring these 2 institutions closer than what I myself proposed after 13 October. And so the two assemblies have never sat together. What is this farce? They have excluded us on the pretext that we were opposed to the merger but they stay on this side of what we have suggested. So I don't see why I should change my mind now.

[Question] How do you see Belgium's future?

[Answer] I am worried. The most pressing issue has not been resolved. And it will now be even more difficult to handle because the people have already given a lot and they haven't seen any changes. Many of our community leaders have succeeded in improving the finances of their communities after having taken difficult measures. Progress has been made in Germany and the Netherlands, but with Martens--nothing.

The issues have not been resolved any better at the community level. And I have seen that the 2 regions which interest me the most have not ceased to decline because at every opportunity Flanders is favored.

[Question] Last question. Will you be a candidate to succeed yourself when your term as president of the PS expires in 1987?

[Answer] Under normal circumstances, yes.

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ECONOMIC

FINLAND

PAPER COMMENTS ON PROBLEMS FROM REDUCED SHIP EXPORTS TO USSR

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 31 May 86 p 2

[Editorial: "Industry Combining Forces"]

[Text] Finland's economic growth has in recent years been more rapid and unemployment has been smaller than on the average in Western industrialized countries. Development has been different primarily in the last year and a half, was the evaluation of the Western industrialized countries' Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development or OECD.

The OECD predicted a modest 1.5-percent growth for Finland this year as well as next year. Other industrialized countries will achieve an average growth of more than 3 percent. This will also reduce unemployment, which Finland's modest growth will not do.

Unemployment is now especially high in Western Europe, which has suffered from slow economic growth for a long time. There several industrial areas have experiencing some difficult adaptation crises. A substantial and bilaterally balanced Soviet trade has eased problems for Finnish industry. Here it has been possible to concentrate resources more consistently on the development of production since it has not become necessary to invest in the support of areas experiencing a crisis as in several other countries.

However, tougher competition on the world's markets is not bypassing Finnish industry. It particularly affects areas, such as the shipyards, which have a production capacity far exceeding demand. The Finnish shipbuilding industry has fortunately not satisfied itself just with the benefits coming from trade with the East, but has sought competitive advantages for itself by means of specialization. Finland's shipyards have so far managed by their own efforts.

However, the worldwide crisis in shipping and shipbuilding is deep. Exceptional measures are needed in Finland also in order that the shipbuilding industry would not suffer as great a collapse as what has occurred in many other industrialized countries -- in spite of state subsidies. The volume of orders on hand in the shipyards has become alarmingly small in Finland also.

The privately owned Wartsila Company and the the state owned Valmet Company have just provided a sample of the quality and the magnitude of the special

measures needed here. By combining their resources the companies want to demonstrate that there are no other alternatives. At their shipyards they now employ a total of 10,000 people or more than two-thirds of this area's total labor force in our country. In the last couple years the number of people at the shipyards has been reduced by approximately 4,000 and a similar reduction is apparently inevitable in spite of the concentration of forces. However, without it the reduction could be much greater and uncontrolled.

Wartsila's and Valmet's shipyards are, for the most part, concentrated in Helsinki, Turku, and Kotka. The employment situation is the best in Helsinki where layoffs that have turned out to be unavoidable can be made with the least amount of pain from the point of view of employment. Nuclear icebreakers ordered by the USSR and scheduled for delivery in 1988 and 1989 are under construction there.

In addition to a joint shipyard company, Wartsila and Valmet intend to combine their resources by means of a joint paper manufacturing machine company also. They already have a mutual division of labor among themselves as well as with Tampella in the paper and cardboard manufacturing machine markets. Their demand is experiencing a growth phase on the world markets. A new competitive power and striking force will be created by combining forces. The company to be created will be the largest in this area in the whole world. Employment problems will not arise in any of the units of the new company.

The combining of resources in the shipyards and the paper-making machine industry will be a positive achievement, which must not under any circumstances be undermined. On the contrary, it is a good example for other companies conducting international trade also at a level more extensive than the national level. Other alternatives will certainly be worse for the whole national economy as well as for the areas in question and their employment situation, in particular.

The state will not have to invest money in these new firms as risk capital or support. On the other hand, it will have to take special measures supporting employment in communities where employment offered by the shipyards is decreasing. Otherwise, the need for this support, however, would have been much greater.

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ENERGY

FINLAND

ENERGY MINISTER: NO DECISION ON NUCLEAR POWER BEFORE 1990

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 4 Jun 86 p 29

[Article: "Lindblom at The Christening of the Rauhalahti Peat Power Plant: No Decision of Nuclear Power Plant Before 1990"]

[Text] Jyvaskyla--Trade and Industry Minister Seppo Lindblom (Social Democrat) warned against overheating of the energy debate on Tuesday in Jyvaskyla while dedicating the Rauhalahti Peat Power Plant for official operation.

Lindblom stated that opposition to nuclear power can easily be made into a political weapon. He expected that the same will occur against coal power in the 1990s.

In reiterating an old position Lindblom hoped that we would not begin quarreling unnecessarily in the energy debate, but that different decisions could be made in peace after sufficiently profound deliberation.

Lindblom thinks that it will be a lot easier to abandon decisions to construct new nuclear power plants than close down nuclear power plants presently in operation. However, there have been increasing demands for such actions, he noted in referring to the conduct of the SMP [Finnish Rural Party], among others, in parliament.

No new nuclear power plant decisions will be made before the end of 1990 at the earliest since the time is simply not yet ripe for such a decision according to Lindblom. Lindblom also quipped that he made this statement in his May Day speech already, long before the accident at Chernobyl.

Need for Electricity Will Increase 2800 Megawatts

There are considerable pressures in Finland to obtain additional energy. The capacity must be increased from the present 10,700 megawatts to 13,500 megawatts by the end of the 1990s.

According to Lindblom, additional capacity will be obtained in the first phase from two 150-megawatt peat-fired power plants and two 500-600 coal-fired power plants.

Imatran Voima [Imatra Power] is technically ready to make a decision on a coal-fired power plant by the fall. Lindblom expects a final decision within the current year.

The next coal-fired power plant will be built either in Pori, Naantali, or Kotka. Pori is in the number one position because of its large harbor.

The coal freighters will be large since they will come from as far away as Australia and South America. The European markets are no longer sufficient for a new power plant.

Peat-fired power plants have been planned in Ostrobothnia. It is expected that reasonably quick decisions will be made on them also.

Lindblom pointed out that peat is a significant national energy reserve, which reduces our dependence on outside disturbances. We are capable of increasing production by 10 percent annually inasmuch as the availability of imported fuels declines or the price increases drastically.

In taking environmental impact into consideration decisions should be made in a centralized manner in favor of large power plants in Lindblom's opinion. Only financially sound companies will be able to apply high technology to the protection of the environment and the prevention of air pollution.

Negotiations are presently being conducted with the USSR and Sweden on the procurement of imported electricity. The present agreement with the USSR will expire in 1989. The greatest obstacle to its renewal will probably be price since the seller knows Finland's situation and can keep the price high.

The Swedes have promised to deliver electricity only until 1993, which will dampen the Finns' enthusiasm to build power lines across the Gulf of Bothnia.

#### License Not Yet Issued

Jyvaskyla's peat-fired power plant is Finland's largest. It produces a total of 240 megawatts of energy in a year. Of this amount, 120 megawatts is delivered as district heating to Jyvaskyla households, 80 megawatts as electricity to the nationwide network, and 40 megawatts as steam to the Serlachius Paper Plant in Kangas.

The plant cost nearly 500 million markkaa and 150,000 man-days went into its construction. Its operation provides jobs for 70 people, of whom 60 make up the production personnel. The excavation of peat employs 250 people in Vappo.

The Supreme Administrative Court is still examining the Rauhalahti Plant's environmental impact statement, which will finally determine how much coal the plant can use as a supplementary source of fuel. The Keski-Suomi Provincial Government considers 2000 tons of sulfur emissions annually to be the limit, which would mean that the proportion of coal be lowered to 20 percent. Imatran Voima hopes that under exceptional conditions the proportion of coal could be increased to even 80 percent.

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